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Low volume high value (LVHV) supply chains such as airline manufacturing, power
plant construction, and shipbuilding are especially susceptible to risks. These industries
are characterized by long lead times and a limited number of suppliers that have both
the technical know-how and manufacturing capabilities to deliver the requisite goods and
services. Disruptions within the supply chain are common and can cause signiﬁcant and
costly delays. Although supply chain risk management and supply chain reliability are
topics that have been studied extensively, most research in these areas focus on high volume supply chains and few studies proactively identify risks. In this research, we develop
methodologies to proactively and quantitatively identify and mitigate supply chain risks
within LVHV supply chains. First, we propose a framework to model the supply chain
system using fault-tree analysis based on the bill of material of the product being sourced.
Next, we put forward a set of mathematical optimization models to proactively identify,
mitigate, and resource at-risk suppliers in a LVHV supply chain with consideration for a

ﬁrm’s budgetary constraints. Lastly, we propose a machine learning methodology to quantify the risk of an individual procurement using multiple logistic regression and industry
available data, which can be used as the primary input to the fault tree when analyzing
overall supply chain system risk. Altogether, the novel approaches proposed within this
dissertation provide a set of tools for industry practitioners to predict supply chain risks,
optimally choose which risks to mitigate, and make better informed decisions with respect
to supplier selection and risk mitigation while avoiding costly delays due to disruptions in
LVHV supply chains.
Key words: Supply chain risk management, system reliability, fault tree analysis, multiple
logistic regression, mixed integer programming, optimization
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The act of coalescing risk-based decision inputs and subsequently making informed
risk mitigating decisions within a ﬁrm is a complex activity. The information available
is often qualitative, contained in silos within the organization, and requires extraordinary
coordination and timeliness in order to mitigate risks before they occur. As a result, these
decisions are made qualitatively and without regard for the overall system impact. The
result is a reactive-based approach that focuses on resolving issues after they have occurred.
The objective of this research is to advance the state of the art with respect to quantitative risk identiﬁcation, mitigation planning, and supplier selection within manufacturing supply chains and serve as a bridge for several academic communities. The methods
developed as part of this research have practical applications within industry. Firms are
constantly challenged with proactively reducing the risk exposure to their respective supply chains. However, the means of doing so in an efﬁcient, integrated, quantitative, and
effective manner is not standard practice. Although a signiﬁcant amount of research has
been published in the areas of Operations Research, Big Data, Supply Chain Risk Management, Reliability Engineering, and Systems Engineering, a gap exists where these areas
intersect and speciﬁcally for low volume high value (LVHV) manufacturing supply chains
1

such as those used in the shipbuilding, aerospace, defense, and power plant construction
industries. Merging and advancing the state of the art across these respective communities
of research creates value in both academic and industrial settings. Ultimately, the beneﬁts
of deploying such a methodology has the potential to save ﬁrms millions of dollars annually. For example, the commercial nuclear power industry, which relies on LVHV supply
chains, can experience costs on the order of $2 million per day as the result of delays in
new power plant construction [1].
1.1

Background and Motivation
The motivation for this research is rooted in more than 15 years of experience by the

author across a variety of ﬁrms and industries. Whether large or small revenue, private or
public, seasoned or start up, high or low volume, make-to-stock or make-to-order, companies struggle to operationalize data across silos. As a result of improved technology, the
ability to collect data becomes easier. However, turning that data into information remains
a challenge. As a result, ﬁrms often utilize weighted scoring methods and qualitative rankings to assess supplier risk. Although simple to deploy, these methods are not typically
validated with respect to the effectiveness in improving risk management decisions nor do
they have the resolution necessary to provide clarity to the decision making process [2].
We have chosen a LVHV supply chain as the focus of this research not only because
of the author’s experience working in the industry, but also because the industry provides
a unique opportunity to examine a supply chain that has an intersection of challenges with
respect to mitigating risks that other types of supply chains do not. Single sources of
2

supply, identifying the appropriate suppliers with the requisite capabilities, cost burdens
associated with navigating regulatory requirements, large product manufacturing, low volume manufacturing, and make-to-order/design are attributes associated with many types of
manufacturing supply chains. However, the supply chains associated with nuclear power
plant construction face all of these challenges and associated risks simultaneously, which
makes the industry an interesting focal point for this research. In 2014, the World Nuclear
Association summarized the challenges facing the nuclear supply chain in three primary
areas - economic, capability, and quality [3].
Economically, the production of nuclear electricity rivals and recently has been lower
than that of coal and has been signiﬁcantly less than gas historically. However, the costs
associated with building a new nuclear power plant are signiﬁcant and continue to increase.
According to the Union of Concerned Scientists, the 75 new power plants constructed
between 1966 and 1977 in the United States incurred an average overrun cost of 207%.
In recent years, construction costs have risen much faster for nuclear power than for other
options. [4]
Problematic designs, equipment delivery, personnel, construction, and commissioning
are inherent risks that drive costs. In order to leverage newer technology, ﬁrst-of-a-kind
reactors are being built, which raise the risks even higher and exposes ﬁrms to delays while
problems with the new technology are worked out. The effects ripple throughout the supply
chain. Furthermore, because of the operational efﬁciencies of nuclear energy, countries are
introducing nuclear power for the ﬁrst time, which creates problems associated with the

3

inherent learning curve of the companies within the supply chains of taking on such an
endeavor. [5]
Despite the economic challenges, approximately 295 new nuclear power plants were
under construction or planned in 2014 introducing an estimated $26 billion of international procurement per year [3]. The increase in demand, increase in complexity, shortage
of skilled labor, and shrinking manufacturing capabilities globally has placed a signiﬁcant
demand on the ﬁrms comprising the supply chains tasked with building the new power
plants. Companies that once provided the nuclear-quality equipment and materials used
in the construction of existing nuclear power plants have either exited the industry or no
longer exist. As a result, a gap exists in equipment and manufacturing capabilities and
quality certiﬁcations within the industry. For example, at one time approximately 400
companies in the United States supplied components for nuclear power plants and 900 nuclear stamps (N-stamp), the certiﬁcation provided by the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers (ASME) that permits ﬁrms to supply certain nuclear materials and components,
had been issued. Today, fewer than 80 suppliers and 200 N-stamp certiﬁcations exist [4].
This research aims to contribute to the current state of the art by answering the following questions while at the same time developing new techniques to assist supply chain professionals in making more proactive decisions to mitigate the risks associated with LVHV
supply chains using industry available data:
1. How can a complex supply chain be organized and analyzed simply to assess risk?
2. What are the mitigation activities that should be undertaken to mitigate risk within
the supply chain, simultaneously minimize risk, and at the same time achieve budgetary goals?
4

3. In advance of placing a purchase order, how can the reliability of a procurement be
predicted and what are the signiﬁcant factors that contribute to the reliability of the
procurement?
Figure 1.1 provides an overview of the research, which is based on three primary areas
associated with answering the aforementioned questions.

Figure 1.1: Overview of research.

First, we develop a methodology to represent a supply chain system as a fault tree and
base it on a bill of materials. This allows us to simultaneously organize the supply chain
into its respective tiers as well as analyze the overall reliability of the supply chain. Furthermore, this approach enables practitioners to simulate purchasing decisions proactively
and assess the effect that the decisions may have with respect to risk. We demonstrate this
concept through three industry-relevant case studies.
Next, building on the fault tree representation, we develop mixed integer programs
to select optimal supplier mitigation activities to minimize risk within the supply chain
5

portfolio under budgetary constraints. We apply the concept to two LVHV supply chains
in the nuclear power plant construction industry using industry-relevant data.
The third element of this research focuses on predicting the risk of a procurement. To
do this, we develop a multiple logistic regression model using The American Production
and Inventory Control Society’s (APICS) Supply Chain Operations Reference (SCOR® )
Model as a basis for our deﬁnition of reliability, which serves as the dependent variable
in our model. Forty-two explanatory variables were selected based on industry experience
and data available. Actual data from a ﬁrm within the nuclear power plant construction
supply chain is used to build the model. We assess the performance and predictability of
the model using standard metrics and analyze the explanatory variables for signiﬁcance.
We envision that the output models developed can serve as an input to the data utilized in
modeling the supply chain system as a fault tree. However, we leave this area for future
research.
The long-term goal of this research is to develop and implement a comprehensive software toolkit for supply chain professionals with the potential to integrate the three elements
of the research described herein with one another and with a ﬁrm’s existing data streams or
as a stand-alone application. The toolkit has the potential to provide supply chain professionals a set of risk assessment and decision support tools that currently do not exist with
regularity in industry. Example areas of supply chain planning where the future application could be implemented include, but are not limited to supply chain design activities,
at the time of supplier selection, and for risk mitigation planning after purchase orders are
placed. This dissertation serves as a foundation for that future work.
6

The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. The next section presents
an overview of the relevant literature and discusses how this research contributes to ﬁlling
current gaps. Subsequent chapters include a review of the speciﬁc literature associated
with the topics discussed. Chapter 2 details the methodology associated with representing
a supply chain system as a fault tree and discusses the usefulness of such an approach when
applied to industry-relevant scenarios. Chapter 3 presents a optimization models to identify risk mitigating activities to minimize the unreliability of the supply chain being studied
with consideration for budgetary constraints. The supply chains of two ﬁrms within the nuclear power plant construction supply chain are analyzed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 develops
a multiple logistic regression model based on industry data to predict the reliability of a
procurement based on 42 explanatory variables. Lastly, Chapter 5 summarizes the conclusions of this research and recommends areas for future work. The Appendix includes a
summary of the notation used within each Chapter as well as the detailed results generated
from the content of Chapter 4.
1.2

Literature Review
This literature review provides a summary of the literature related to supply chain risk

management, which lies at the core of the three areas discussed in this dissertation (see
Figure 1.2). A more detailed review of the literature pertaining to the areas discussed are
contained within the respective chapters of the dissertation that follow.
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Figure 1.2: Topics of research outlined in this dissertation.

In 2003, Juttner et al. noted that supply chain risk management was in its infancy and
outlined an agenda for future research in four primary areas: 1) assessing the risk sources
for the supply chain, 2) deﬁning the risk concept and adverse consequences, 3) identifying
the risk drivers of the supply chain strategy, and 4) mitigating risks for the supply chain
[6]. In the time since, a great deal of research has been applied to the ﬁeld of supply
chain risk management [7]. Between 1978 and 2003, an average of ﬁve papers per year
were published in the area of supply chain risk modeling compared to an average of 44
papers per year in the time since [7]. Supply chain risk has also increased as a result of
supply chains becoming more complex due to an increase in global sourcing and “leaningdown” [8]. In addition, the sources of risk to a supply chain have increased in complexity.
However, much of what has been published in the literature focuses on a speciﬁc function
or a part of a supply chain and does not consider the entire supply chain as a portfolio [9].
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Our research aims to model supply chain risk across the supply chain by viewing the
supply chain as a system and schematically as a fault tree. By taking this approach, we
are able to overlay models that propose activities to mitigate risks. In addition, we propose
models that assess the sources of risk as well as identify the drivers of those risks. Recently,
some authors have proposed that the cross-fertilization of concepts, tools, and theories provides a pathway to advance the area of supply chain risk management modeling research
[10]. Our research follows this theory and brings together the areas of modeling (logistic regression), optimization (mixed integer programming), and fault tree analysis in order
to provide the supply chain practitioner with a more robust quantitative decision making
toolbox to manage and mitigate risks.
Although several authors have proposed methods to quantify supply chain risk and the
factors affecting that risk, none that we are aware of apply the methods to LVHV industries
[11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. In addition, no published works found as part of this research
model supply chain reliability in terms of the metrics proposed in the SCOR® model.
Mixed integer programming is a common optimization method. However, when applied to supply chain risk management, many of the proposed models use expected cost
or proﬁt in the objective function [17]. Some authors propose to minimize cost in relation
to site location, disaster preparedness, transportation network design, and geographic risks
[18, 19, 20, 21, 22]. Instead, our research focuses on maximizing reliability across the supply chain system, which is represented as a fault tree. Similar modeling techniques have
been applied to fault tree analysis and reliability optimization [23, 24]. However, not when
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the underlying fault tree is constructed from a product’s bill of materials and represents the
supply chain system responsible for delivering that product to a ﬁrm.
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CHAPTER 2
PROACTIVE COST-EFFECTIVE RISK MITIGATION IN A LOW VOLUME HIGH
VALUE SUPPLY CHAIN USING FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
2.1

Introduction
In this chapter we address the problem of being able to determine areas of risk within

a supply chain proactively and subsequently implement an effective mitigation strategy to
address those risks. Speciﬁcally, a quantitative, prevention-based methodology using fault
tree analysis is employed. The unreliability of the supply chain is modeled as a fault tree
whereby the top event represents a critical assembly and basic events are based on the
critical assembly’s bill of materials. The many individual components and subassemblies
comprising the critical assembly are represented by events within the fault tree. Event and
gate probabilities are a function of the unreliability of delivering the particular component,
subassembly, or critical assembly on-time. As a result, the completed fault tree provides
insight into the at-risk areas within the supply chain being studied, an opportunity to apply
interdiction strategies at various points within the supply chain, and study the consequences
of implementing particular actions in advance of executing those strategies.
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2.1.1

Motivation

Within recent years, a number of factors related to how businesses are managed have
exposed supply chains to additional risks. These factors include: (1) a focus on efﬁciency
rather than effectiveness, (2) supply chain globalization, (3) focused factories and centralized distribution, (4) a trend toward outsourcing, and (5) reduction of the supply base [6].
Industries that rely on low volume, high value, long lead time products have greater consequences when disruptions occur and especially if risks are realized at the latter stages
of production or downstream within the supply chain. Examples of such industries include airline manufacturing [25], nuclear power plant construction [26], and shipbuilding
[27]. Further compounding the risk exposure within these supply chains is that by nature,
manufacturing capability and qualiﬁed suppliers are scarce.
Manufacturing ﬁrms are always seeking better ways to mitigate risk when making decisions related to the purchase of goods and services. These decisions are quite complex
and require decision makers to consider several inputs. In addition to price, considerations
must be made regarding the capabilities of the suppliers as well as the probability that the
goods and services are delivered on-time and meet quality and design speciﬁcations. Firms
that produce standard high volume low value products (i.e., consumer electronics, household appliances, clothing, etc.) are challenged with managing multiple sources effectively
while keeping prices low. On the other hand, manufacturers that produce relatively LVHV
products (i.e., aerospace, power plant construction, energy exploration, shipbuilding, etc.),
may be constrained by the scarcity of suppliers with the requisite manufacturing capabilities to produce the product of interest. Furthermore, these industries typically have more
12

stringent quality and regulatory requirements, which may narrow the supply base even further. With such few sourcing options, ﬁrms are often greatly exposed to the risks associated
with a limited number of suppliers. This chapter will focus on a proposed method to costeffectively and proactively mitigate the risk associated with sourcing decisions in LVHV
supply chains.
Airliner manufacturing is one example of a LVHV supply chain. In 2014, one report
noted that since the start of manufacturing in 2007, Boeing had manufactured 228 [28] of
their 787 Dreamliner aircraft at an average unit price of $258 million [29]. As of 2011,
Boeing’s total expenditure on the 787 program was estimated at $32 billion [30]. Boeing
utilized a global outsourcing model in the design and manufacture of the 787; the likes of
which had never been seen before. The outsourcing model was viewed as a primary means
to signiﬁcantly reduce development lead times and costs. In 2001, at a Boeing Technical
Excellence Symposium [31], Boeing engineers warned of potential quality problems with
prime contractors as a result of the “hands-off” outsourcing model being deployed. Ultimately, the launch of the Boeing 787 was delayed by more than 3 years and had budget
overruns on the order of billions of dollars [25].
According to Boeing, one 787 Dreamliner is manufactured from approximately 2.3
million parts and an overall supply base of 5,000 factories support the manufacture of their
ﬁve primary airliners [32]. The combination of the overall investment, diversity and quantity of suppliers, volume of products, and severity of the impact of a delay illustrates the
need to proactively and systemically approach risk mitigation in such a supply chain. Do-
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ing so in a quantitative manner enables businesses to make better risk-informed decisions
cost-effectively.
The supply chain associated with the manufacture of LVHV components can be complex and lead times of critical components can be on the order of many years. Further, the
unit cost of some components can exceed one hundred thousand dollars. Due to the large
size of the components - some can weigh several tons - and subsequently the fabrication
and manufacturing capability required to fulﬁll design requirements, a limited number of
global suppliers exist. The quality and regulatory requirements placed on suppliers within
these industries also increase the complexity of decision making. Hundreds of suppliers
may be used in the assembly of an airline or in the construction of a nuclear power plant. In
summary, suppliers with requisite capabilities are scarce, supplier development and order
fulﬁllment lead times are long, and supply chain failures can have a signiﬁcant impact on
delivery, which can result in legal and ﬁnancial ramiﬁcations. One estimate places the cost
of delay in construction of a nuclear power plant at $2 million per day [1]. As a result,
supplier selection and proactive risk mitigating activities are critical to ensure that suppliers deliver on time. Failing to implement such an approach proactively can be costly and
time consuming.
As enterprise resource planning and manufacturing execution systems have improved,
ﬁrms have become more objective with planning and scheduling decisions. Likewise, site
selection, inventory stocking levels, and transportation decision models have become more
sophisticated within supply chains. However, a gap in common industry practice still exists with respect to providing timely and cost-effective risk interdiction activities. As a
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result of the regulatory scrutiny on LVHV industries producing critical components, these
interdiction strategies are typically focused on compliance to regulator standards and not
necessarily or speciﬁcally targeted to the performance of suppliers. Although compliance
to regulations is vital, doing so does not ensure efﬁcient or cost effective risk mitigation.
Furthermore, the use of quantitative decision making instruments that consider the costrisk tradeoff is scarce.
This research provides a methodology to solve the problems associated with quantitatively assessing risk, selecting suppliers, and developing risk interdiction plans within a
LVHV supply chain. In doing so, we model a product’s bill of material and subsequent
supply chain in the form of a fault tree. Unreliability measures are calculated and evaluated. Alternate sourcing options are evaluated on the basis of a tradeoff between risk
reduction and the cost of implementing the mitigating actions. Examples of alternative
options include redundant suppliers, improving existing suppliers, selecting higher performing suppliers, and combinations thereof.
2.1.2

Related Literature

A wide body of literature is available in the area of risk response and primarily focuses
on redundancies, safety stock and inventory buffers, auditing, management intervention,
and other strategies to hedge the consequences of a risk being realized [33]. However,
opportunities exist in the areas of (1) assessing risk sources, (2) deﬁning risk and consequences, (3) identifying risk drivers, and (4) mitigating risks [6]. As a result, instruments
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that model these areas associated with risk prevention are scarce as noted in several literature surveys [34, 35, 36, 22].
Researchers have analyzed supply chain risk management extensively from a qualitative point of view [37]. In their agenda for future research in the ﬁeld, Juttner et al.[6]
proposed a basic construct for supply chain risk management and noted needs for more
practical approaches to risk assessment, a supply chain and industry-speciﬁc approach,
better approaches for managers to identify risk drivers, and processes to guide trade-off
decision making between risk reduction and mitigation costs. Likewise, several authors
have proposed strategic frameworks and approaches to supply chain risk management
[37, 8, 6, 38, 39, 33, 40] and some have focused speciﬁcally on mitigating such risks
[41, 42, 43, 44, 45]. However, empirically based published work in the area remained
sparse until recently and approaches have varied [46, 8]. In a review of quantitative models
for managing supply chain risks, Tang [17] suggests that it is appropriate to use cost or
proﬁt as a means to evaluate options for managing operational risks and the usefulness of
“back-up” suppliers. Furthermore, he discusses demand management, product management, and information management strategies. Toward the goal of developing an approach
that minimizes cost as a means to evaluate options, Aqlan and Lam [47] propose a model
to maximize risk reduction under budgetary constraints using bow-tie analysis. However,
the authors use expert opinion as the basis for the likelihood and impact of the supply chain
risks.
In practice, decisions related to supplier selection are often unstructured [48]. A variety of multi-criteria decision making approaches have been studied with respect to supplier
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selection and envelop several factors in the categories of quality, cost, delivery and service
[49]. Other research incorporates order quantities and capacity constraints into the supplier selection decision making process [50, 51]. Methods include the analytical hierarchy
process, goal programming, data envelopment, fuzzy set theory, genetic algorithms, and
others [52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59]. However, consideration for the impact on business
objectives is lacking [60].
The area of supply chain disruption has been studied extensively. Blackhurst et al. [61]
identiﬁed discovery, recovery, and redesign as the three primary areas crucial to managing supply chain disruptions. Among other conclusions, the authors point out that tools
are needed to establish a regular system of supply chain disruption predictability and that
dynamic or real-time measures are important.
Disruptive threats such as terrorism [62, 63], natural disasters [64], sourcing decisions
[65], demand [66, 67, 68], and others are discussed in the literature as well as strategic frameworks and supply chain design methodologies [69, 70, 71, 72, 73] by which to
manage and mitigate those threats. Work by researchers such as Snyder [74] and Cui [21]
present models that consider risk in facility location as a method of risk management within
supply chains. Inventory buffers [75, 36, 69, 73] and product mix [76] are also discussed
as mitigating strategies against disruptions. Lastly, the empirical data resulting from the
consequences of environmental disruptions such as the earthquake and tsunami that struck
Japan in 2011 have been studied and models developed [77, 78].
Fault tree analysis was originally developed by Bell Telephone Laboratories to evaluate the launch control system of the Minuteman Missile in 1961 [79, 80]. The method is
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objective and resolves highly complex systems into a prioritized set of causes leading to
the top event (failure). Fault trees are helpful in analyzing different ways in which a particular failure can occur and the probability of its occurrence [81, 82]. Since its inception,
fault tree analysis has become an accepted means for understanding hazards and failures
associated with complex systems. However, the speciﬁc application to risk identiﬁcation
and interdiction within a supply chain is scarce. Klimov and Merkuryev [83] propose a
quantitative approach to supply chain risk identiﬁcation using a combination of reliability
theory and simulation. However, their approach results in the probability of survival for
the supply chain being studied for a speciﬁed period of time.
Traditionally, the application of fault tree analysis focuses on process or product failures with the purpose of identifying safety or reliability issues within the system being
studied [80, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92] or may reference an element of the supply
chain as part of the larger system being studied as an event within the fault tree [93]. Other
authors [42, 33, 39, 94] note fault tree analysis as a tool for risk analysis within a supply
chain; however, do not develop the concept in great detail. Where fault trees have been
used to identify risk within a supply chain, the events that may occur within the supply
chain are represented in aggregate and not developed to the level of detail of individual
suppliers within the network [95, 96, 97, 47]. For example, Yuhua and Datao incorporate
the physical means by which an oil pipeline may fail subsequently leading to a disruption
in the oil and gas transmission industry, but do not include an assessment of other factors
that may cause a supply chain disruption. Volkanovski et al. use a similar approach in their
assessment of power system transmission reliability. In their assessment of drinking water
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distribution systems, Lindhe et al. take a slightly different approach using the categories
of failure within three subsystems to illustrate supply failures in terms of quantity as well
as quality. Aqlan and Lam propose the use of fault tree analysis and event tree analysis as
part of bow tie analysis, but do not construct speciﬁc fault trees. Often and especially when
empirical data is not available, judgmental assessments [94] are made to estimate failure
rates and probabilities when fault tree analysis is used in supply chain risk mitigation. This
can lead to decisions that are less transparent to management and can be based on opinions
rather than facts. Further, using surveys and interviews to estimate the necessary data can
be time consuming.
Fault tree analysis is a well-known tool for quantifying and mitigating risk. Some
people have applied fault tree analysis to supply chains. However, there are some gaps
related to the manner in which the fault tree is constructed and the data used in analyzing
the fault tree. In this research, we seek to develop an approach that closes these gaps
by generating a fault tree based on information that is readily available to analysts such
as bills of material and historical data that describes supplier performance. An approach
like this allows a user to be explicit about deﬁning the fault tree events and probabilities,
making the fault tree itself more transparent. Toward this end, we present a method for
constructing a fault tree based on a critical component’s bill of materials that represents
the risks associated with individual suppliers within a supply chain using historical data as
a basis for unreliability measures. Such an approach lends itself to being automated and
results in more timely decision making.
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2.1.3

Contributions

The approach described herein proposes a new application of fault tree analysis and
in doing so provides a structured approach to represent the risks associated with sourcing decisions and speciﬁcally supplier selection. The methodology is based on empirical
data sets that represent supplier performance and provides practitioners a decision support
methodology to assist in supplier selection and make trade-offs between risk reduction and
the costs associated with reducing such risks. Additionally, the output enables effective
and proactive risk mitigation actions to be deployed cost effectively to suppliers with the
greatest risk exposure across the company’s aggregate supply chain. Speciﬁcally, this research builds upon previous work in the areas of fault tree analysis and supply chain risk
mitigation by making the following main contributions. (1) A new methodology to formulate a fault tree using the bill of materials of a LVHV product being manufactured is
demonstrated and subsequently utilized to quantify risk (unreliability) within the ﬁrm’s
supply chain. The data used to formulate the fault tree is based on real-world scenarios and hypothetical on-time delivery data that is readily available to most ﬁrms. (2) A
quantitative approach is employed to model the trade-off between risk reduction and the
investment required to mitigate risks within the supply chain being studied. The development of time functions and associated costs are computed and subsequently combined with
the results of the fault tree analysis to provide the sourcing practitioner a methodology for
risk-informed, cost-effective decision making. (3) A set of computational experiments in
the form of simple scenarios provides results for decision makers to better understand the
tradeoffs between risk reduction and total risk mitigation costs.
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2.2

Problem Description
The purpose of the methodology described is to compute supply chain risk using fault

tree analysis and subsequently model alternative decisions in order to take better riskinformed actions regarding supplier selection and cost effective risk mitigation. In order to
explain this methodology, we divide its formulation into two stages: (1) fault tree formulation and (2) risk mitigation activities, which are described in greater detail in the sections
that follow.
In its basic form, a supply chain is a system of ﬁrms connected to one another through
relationships and physical transportation networks. Speciﬁcally, as Christopher [98] points
out, a supply chain is a “network of organizations that are involved, through upstream and
downstream linkages, in the different processes and activities that produce value in the
form of products and services delivered to the ultimate consumer.” Fault tree analysis is
a well-known method to analyze the reliability of systems and translates physical systems
into a structured logic diagram, in which certain speciﬁed causes lead to one speciﬁc top
event of interest [99]. Thus, our methodology is based on the ability to represent the system
of ﬁrms and products being sourced from those ﬁrms within a supply chain as a fault tree in
the same way that someone may analyze the reliability of a nuclear power plant or chemical
processing facility by analyzing the underlying components and systems.
2.2.1

Fault Tree Formulation

In a fault tree, the main failure event of interest is called the top event [100]. For the
purposes of the approach described in this chapter, the top event in the fault tree represents
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the probability that a product will not be delivered on-time as the result of subsequent
failures by suppliers of goods and/or services within the supply chain. From the top event,
the fault tree is developed into intermediate and basic events and is based on the bill of
material structure of the product being studied.
In this research, we use the term unreliability to describe a supplier’s failure to deliver
a given product or service on-time. Speciﬁcally, unreliability is deﬁned as the inability
for a supplier to perform as intended (i.e., deliver on-time) for a speciﬁed period of time
[101]. In other words, unreliability (F (t)) is the probability that the system experiences at
least one failure during a speciﬁed time period, which is within the interval [0, t] where t =
52 weeks. Reliability (R(t)) is the probability that the supplier makes all of its deliveries
on time within the time interval and is related to unreliability through the relationship
R(t) + F (t) = 1 (where R(t) 2 [0, 1], F (t) 2 [0, 1]). Historical delivery data is used to
compute the unreliability of delivering on-time and is discussed later.
Further, we assume that the failures that occur within the supply chain and that subsequently lead to the unreliability of delivering products and services on-time are instantaneous and repairable as opposed to unrepairable (i.e., catastrophic) in nature. We do not
take into consideration the duration of time to get the event under repair back into working
condition and leave these topics to explore in the future. As a result of these assumptions,
the use of unreliability is appropriate.
A thrust bearing is used to illustrate the concept (see Figure 2.1) and is representative
of a LVHV industry. However, the product selected could have been the electric motor
assembly that houses the thrust bearing or in a more complex fashion, a product that utilizes
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a motor within its fabrication (i.e., an aircraft, a building, a ship, etc.). In that case, the
motor would be shown as a sub-assembly on that product’s bill of materials.
The thrust bearing, which is a common assembly used in the manufacture of electrical and mechanical devices is broken down into its main subcomponents - thrust shoes,
brackets, leveling links, and support rings. Each subcomponent is then subsequently decomposed into the most basic goods and services (hereafter referred to as “basic services”)
used in their respective manufacturing processes. The most elemental basic services that
comprise the subcomponent (i.e., melt stock, casting, machining, etc.) are basic events
within the fault tree. These basic events combine to form intermediate events, which correspond to the subcomponents (i.e., thrust shoes, brackets, etc.) that make up the product
being studied and are represented by the top event in the fault tree. Each basic and intermediate event is described by the unreliability of the respective supplier chosen to provide
the required service on-time. Speciﬁcally, fij (t) represents the probability that the supplier
has failed to deliver their respective service on-time within the interval [0, t]. For simpliﬁcation, we will use the notation fij to describe the unreliability of supplier i to deliver
service j hereafter; it is assumed that t = 52 weeks (one year).
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Figure 2.1: Thrust bearing bill of material.

After the product’s bill of material has been deconstructed into basic services, suppliers
are selected. For the thrust bearing example described above, the supply chain consists of
seven (i 2 [1, 7]) basic services sourced from 28 (j 2 [1, 28]) independent suppliers. In the
case studies presented later, we will introduce two additional suppliers whose data will be
described further. Table 2.1 summarizes the basic services used to manufacture the thrust
bearing.

Table 2.1: Thrust bearing basic services.
Basic Service
Casting
Forging
Heat Treatment
Laboratory and Test
Machining
Melt Stock
Plating

Basic Service Index (i)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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Historical performance data associated with each supplier’s ability to supply the respective basic service on-time is used to formulate the unreliability measure (fij ) and is
described in Equation (2.1). Table 2.2 summarizes the probability that each supplier fails
to deliver the respective service on-time.
P
xij
Pij
ij yij

fij = 1
where

fij = annualized unreliability for basic service i sourced from supplier j
xij = annualized units of basic service i delivered on-time by supplier j
yij = units of basic service i expected annually by supplier j
fij 2 [0, 1]
xij 2 [0, 1]
yij 2 [1, 1]
i 2 [1, n]
j 2 [1, m]
n = total number of basic services within supply chain
m = total number of suppliers within supply chain
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(2.1)

Table 2.2: Combined basic service and supplier unreliability data.
Basic Service
Plating
Laboratory and Test
Machining
Casting
Forging
Laboratory and Test
Heat Treatment
Machining
Casting
Laboratory and Test
Heat Treatment
Machining
Casting
Laboratory and Test
Heat Treatment
Machining
Casting
Forging
Heat Treatment
Melt Stock
Laboratory and Test
Melt Stock
Laboratory and Test
Melt Stock
Laboratory and Test
Melt Stock
Laboratory and Test

Basic Service Index (i)
7
4
5
1
2
4
3
5
1
4
3
5
1
4
3
5
1
2
3
6
4
6
4
6
4
6
4

Supplier (j)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Unreliability (fij )
0.0134
0.0337
0.0247
0.0523
0.0889
0.0260
0.0133
0.0125
0.1215
0.0420
0.0150
0.0125
0.1263
0.0393
0.0189
0.0224
0.0968
0.0820
0.0282
0.0092
0.0142
0.0123
0.0417
0.0251
0.0327
0.0212
0.0421

In its basic form, the fault tree is a logic diagram that depicts events that must occur
in order for subsequent events to occur. A fault tree is composed of entities known as
gates that serve to permit or inhibit the passage of fault logic up the tree and show the
relationships of events needed for a higher event (output of the gate) to occur [102]. Since
gates relate events within the fault tree in the same way as Boolean operations, the rules of
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Boolean Algebra apply. Two types of gates are used - AND gates and OR gates. AND gates
represent the intersection of the events attached to the gate and are used to demonstrate
situations whereby redundant suppliers are employed. The output failure associated with
an AND gate occurs only if all of the input events to that gate fail; whereas, if at least one
of the events that are an input to an OR gate fail, the output event of that gate also fails.
OR gates represent conditions where only one supplier is supplying a given basic service
and if that supplier should fail to deliver on-time, a disruption to the supply chain occurs
resulting in a failure to deliver the ﬁnal product (i.e., trust bearing) on-time.
Equations (2.2) and (2.3) describe the formulae used in the calculation of OR and AND
gate probabilities, gkOR and gkAN D respectively. By assuming that basic and intermediate
input events and the respective unreliabilities are independent of one another, we are able
to utilize the bottom-up gate calculation method in calculating the top-event failure rate.
We achieve independence of events by assuming that each supplier of one basic service
is independent of all other suppliers of basic services within the supply chain. Further,
failures to deliver services on-time within the supply chain are exclusive to individual
suppliers and are not correlated between suppliers. For example, a catastrophic event that
impacts a geographic region and includes multiple suppliers is not considered here and
is left for future research. Without these assumptions, the minimal cut set approach for
analyzing fault trees is more appropriate [103].
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gkOR = 1
gkAN D =

Y

Y

(1

fij )

(2.2)

i,j

fij

(2.3)

i,j

where

gkOR = the gate unreliability of OR gate k
gkAN D = the gate unreliability of AND gate k
k 2 [1, q]
q = the total number of gates within the fault tree
k = 1 for top event gate

The resulting output of the fault tree is the system unreliability (FS ), which corresponds
to the top gate calculation in the fault tree (k = 1) and is analogous to the probability that
the product being studied (i.e., thrust bearing) will not be delivered on-time. Subsequently,
the system-level measures are used to determine the effect of making changes to lower
level events within the fault tree, which correspond to sourcing decisions within the supply
chain. Further, we consider the costs associated with these decisions in relation to their
favorable or unfavorable impact on the system level risk. In the sections that follow, we

28

demonstrate this generalized concept through illustrative examples, but ﬁrst we discuss the
cost basis for formulating the risk-mitigation decisions using the proposed methodology.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the baseline case of the fault tree that describes the supply chain
associated with the manufacture of a thrust bearing and Table 2.3 contains the corresponding gate unreliability data. All gates within this scenario are represented by OR gates and
result in an overall system unreliability (FS ) of 0.6692. Initially, there is no redundancy in
this system. Later, we introduce redundancy in the form of multiple suppliers for a given
commodity using AND gates. Using the aforementioned deﬁnition of unreliability, this
supply chain has a 66.92% probability that the system will experience at least one failure
to deliver on-time within a one-year time frame.
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Figure 2.2: Baseline fault tree.
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Table 2.3: Baseline gate unreliability results.
Gate Number (k)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Gate Type
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR

Gate Unreliability (gkOR , gkAN D )
0.6692
0.2463
0.0466
0.2094
0.2250
0.2331
0.2615
0.1774
0.0389
0.1788
0.0563
0.1864
0.0574
0.2400
0.0233
0.0535
0.0570
0.0624

In order to demonstrate the efﬁcacy of the approach described, we have provided a
simpliﬁed model and base the model on the following simplifying assumptions:
1. Independent Events. The events used to build the fault trees presented are assumed
to be independent. As a result, the success or failure of one supplier to deliver a
product or service on-time is independent of any other success or failure within the
fault tree. We achieve this by assuming that all products and services are sourced
from different suppliers. In doing so, we are able to use the simpliﬁed gate-based
approach to calculate the top event failure rate and probability.
2. Repairable System. A repairable system is one in which conditions exist such that a
failure, when occurring to a basic event, is announced, quickly detected and the system continues to operate with a known failure [100]. In the context of this research,
we have chosen to treat the supply chain being studied as a repairable system mostly
because any individual supplier would most likely continue operations throughout
the failure to deliver. This is practical since for LVHV supply chains, the switching
cost is signiﬁcant. Although we have chosen to note the system as repairable, there is
no practical impact to our analysis since we have chosen to utilize gate calculations
and have not used minimal cut sets in our analysis.
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3. Unreliability. Unreliability is chosen as the parameter to assess risk within a supply
chain more speciﬁcally and is deﬁned as the probability the fault event occurs during
a speciﬁed time interval, usually 0 to t [100]. This parameter is appropriate given
that unreliability is used to describe the probability that the product will be delivered late during a one year time horizon. The unreliability parameter alone does not
account for the effect that the failure has on the length of the delay caused by the disruption and is of greater consequence when analyzing the effectiveness of redundant
cases (AND gates) within the system.
2.2.2

Risk Mitigation Costs

In addition to the calculated risk metrics that result from the fault trees (e.g., unreliability), we have also chosen to introduce cost measures to help the analyst compute the cost
effectiveness of various risk mitigating actions. Four cost-based decisions to mitigate risk
within the supply base are considered and are based on the time associated with executing
the respective activity. The time functions presented are a function of the supplier’s unreliability or change (improvement) in unreliability. The time functions were derived using a
line-of-best-ﬁt approach and based on data sets from industry examples. Equations (2.4),
(2.5), and (2.6) describe the time to (1) improve a supplier (Equation (2.4)), (2) onboard
a supplier (Equation (2.5)), and (3) provide oversight at a supplier (Equation (2.6)). The
appropriate time function is applied to each of four potential decisions to mitigate risk: (1)
add a new supplier, (2) replace the existing supplier with an improved supplier, (3) improve
the existing supplier, and (4) provide oversight for a supplier. An hourly rate of $104 per
hour is used to calculate the associated costs from each time function and is considered
representative of the fully burdened rate for an Engineer in the United States [104] for a
LVHV industry. The models are annualized for comparison purposes and travel costs and
other expenses are not included in the cost estimate. Table 2.4 summarizes the time func32

tions used for each of the risk mitigating decisions and demonstrates the cost calculation
for each. These functions are subsequently used to predict the costs associated with the
aforementioned risk mitigation activities within the supply chain.

t improve
= 4278u1.84 ,
ij

(2.4)

t onboard
= 43e 3.83fij ,
ij

(2.5)

t oversight
= 23e 2.64fij ,
ij

(2.6)

u = 1

fij,S2
fij,S1

(2.7)

where:

t improve
= time (hours) invested annually to improve a supplier,
ij
t onboard
= time (hours) invested annually to onboard a supplier,
ij
t oversight
= time (hours) invested annually to provide oversight to maintain supplier,
ij
u = unreliability improvement ratio from s1 to s2 ,
e t 2.71828
s1 = initial state of unreliability of supplier j to deliver basic service i,
s2 = improved state of unreliability of supplier j to deliver basic service i,
fij,S1 > fij,S2
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Table 2.4: Costs as a function of time for risk mitigation actions.
Risk Mitigating Action
Add a new supplier
Replace existing supplier with an improved supplier
Improve existing supplier
Provide supplier oversight to maintain performance

Cost Calculation
c onboard
= $104 ⇤ t onboard
ij
ij
onboard
c ij
= $104 ⇤ t onboard
ij
improve
c improve
=
$104
⇤
t
ij
ij
oversight
oversight
c ij
= $104 ⇤ t ij

Using Equations (2.4), (2.5), and (2.6) in combination with Table 2.4, costs to mitigate
risk are estimated. For example, reducing the unreliability (i.e., improve reliability of
on-time delivery) of a casting supplier (j = 13; see Table 2.2) from 0.1263 to 0.0947
(25% reduction) results in an improvement ratio (Equation (2.7)) of u = 0.25. Using
Equation (2.4), the time required to reduce this particular casting supplier’s unreliability
by 25% is 334.3 hours and subsequently costs the ﬁrm $34,763 using the information
described in Table 2.4. If that same casting supplier (j = 13) was replaced by a casting
supplier with an unreliability of 0.0947, the time to onboard (Equation (2.5)) the new
supplier is 61.8 hours, which corresponds to a cost of $6,427. Similarly, using Equation
(2.6), implementing additional oversight activities at the existing casting supplier (f1,13 ) to
maintain their current performance results in an estimated time commitment of 32.1 hours
and corresponds to an annual cost of $3,339. In contrast, adding a redundant supplier
with equivalent unreliability as the initial casting supplier (f1,13 = 0.1263) costs the ﬁrm
approximately $7,254 (69.8 hours). Comparing the aforementioned risk mitigation options
solely based on cost, the least expensive solution is to provide additional oversight at the
existing supplier, which is standard industry practice. However, this is a short-sighted
approach since the impact of the decision to the overall improvement (reduction) to the
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reliability (unreliability) of the supply chain is not considered when compared against the
other more costly alternatives. This concept is explored further in the sections that follow
by combining the costs of mitigation activities with the impact of those activities to risk
reduction in the supply chain using fault tree analysis.
2.3

Risk Mitigation Scenarios
This section describes case studies to illustrate contributions of this work and demon-

strate how sourcing professionals may use such an instrument to determine the scenarios,
risks, and subsequent risk mitigation plans prior to order placement with the intent of selecting suppliers and combinations of suppliers that optimize their supply chain portfolio.
In the course of building each simple scenario, we introduce a second supplier for one
commodity, an improved supplier for one commodity, and an improved second supplier
for one commodity. Next, we analyze the effect that each of these scenarios has on the system. In each case, we maintain the assumption that all sources of supply are independent,
that a new supplier can begin producing in the same timeframe as an existing supplier, and
that initial demand is level-loaded between the two suppliers to hedge risk.
The case described by the fault tree in Figure 2.2 is used as the baseline scenario. Table
2.2 includes the event data used as input to the fault tree and is updated accordingly for
each scenario discussed.
2.3.1

Scenario 1: Introduce a Second Equivalent Supplier

In this ﬁrst scenario, we introduce a second casting supplier (j = 28) in the manufacture
of the thrust bearing leveling links with an equivalent unreliability (f1,13 = f1,28 = 0.1263)
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as the existing casting supplier (j = 13). Within the fault tree, the two suppliers become
inputs to a new gate (k = 19), which is an AND gate. We have selected to introduce a
second source for this supplier and commodity combination because the existing casting
supplier has the highest unreliability of any other supplier in the supply chain (0.1263).
The addition of a second equivalent casting source results in a total system unreliability of
0.6274 (FS = 0.6274) compared to the baseline case where FS = 0.6692 and corresponds
to an approximate 6.2% reduction in the risk of the supply chain. However, the action
of adding an equivalently unreliable supplier comes at a cost of $7,254 (Equation (2.5),
Table 2.4). Table 2.5 includes the data associated with the second casting supplier. Figure
2.3 shows the section of the baseline fault tree that has been updated as a result of the
addition of the second casting source and Table 2.6 contains the corresponding data. All
other aspects of the fault tree architecture remain the same.

Table 2.5: Second casting source (j = 28) data table.

Description
Casting

Basic Service
(i)
1

Unreliability
(fij )
0.1263

Supplier (j)
28
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System
Unreliability
(FS )
0.6274

Mitigation
Cost
$7,254

Figure 2.3: Modiﬁcation to baseline fault tree architecture for Scenario 1.

Table 2.6: Gate unreliability results updated for Scenario 1.
Gate Number (k)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Gate Type
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
AND

Gate Unreliability (gkOR , gkAN D )
0.6274
0.2463
0.0466
0.2094
0.2250
0.1363
0.2615
0.1774
0.0389
0.1788
0.0563
0.0837
0.0574
0.2400
0.0233
0.0535
0.0570
0.0624
0.0160
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2.3.2

Scenario 2: Improve (or Replace) the Existing Supplier

In the second scenario, instead of utilizing a second source to reduce risk with the
highest risk supplier, we instead decide to work with the same casting supplier (j = 13)
to improve their performance by 25%. As a result, the fault tree architecture remains the
same as the baseline case (see Figure 2.2). However, the supplier’s unreliability (f1,13 ) is
reduced by 25% (from 0.1263 to 0.0947). Table 2.8 shows the updated gate calculation
results for Scenario 2. Using Equation (2.4) and the information contained in Table 2.4,
improving the existing casting supplier comes with an annual cost of $34,763. We will
discuss the impact of these costs in the subsequent section and will see that the effects
on the overall risk proﬁle will remain the same as if we replaced the existing supplier
with an improved supplier. However, the cost to develop a new, improved casting source
(f1,29 = 0.0947) to replace the existing supplier is $6,427 (Equation (2.5) and Table 2.4).
Hereafter, we will reference the case when the existing supplier is improved as Scenario
2a and the case when the existing supplier is replaced as Scenario 2b when analyzing the
associated costs. Table 2.7 includes the updated input data used in calculating the top
event unreliability for the fault tree associated with Scenario 2. Overall, the impact to the
system is equivalent for Scenario 2a and Scenario 2b (FS = 0.6572) and corresponds to
an approximately 1.8% reduction in the overall system unreliability when compared to the
baseline case (FS = 0.6692).
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Table 2.7: Improve (or Replace) existing casting source (j = 13) data table.

Description
Casting
Casting

Basic Service
(i)
1
1

Unreliability
(fij )
0.0947
0.0947

Supplier (j)
13
29

System
Unreliability
(FS )
0.6572
0.6572

Mitigation
Cost
$34,763
$6,427

Table 2.8: Gate unreliability results updated for Scenario 2.
Gate Number (k)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

2.3.3

Gate Type
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR

Gate Unreliability (gkOR , gkAN D )
0.6572
0.2463
0.0466
0.2094
0.2250
0.2054
0.2615
0.1774
0.0389
0.1788
0.0563
0.1570
0.0574
0.2400
0.0233
0.0535
0.0570
0.0624

Scenario 3: Introduce a Second Improved Supplier

In the third scenario, we essentially combine the two previous scenarios to determine
the effect on the system of introducing a second casting supplier (j = 30) with better
performance than the initial casting supplier (j = 13). Like in Scenario 2, we assume the
improvement is equal to 25%. The fault tree architecture remains the same as in Scenario
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1 with modiﬁcation to the unreliability data and resulting gate calculations (see Figure 2.4
and Table 2.10). Similar to Scenario 1, costs are incurred by bringing on this new supplier.
However, since the supplier (j = 30) has a track record of 25% improvement performance
over the initial supplier (j = 13), the on boarding and development cost is less ($6,427).
The data used in fault tree calculations for Scenario 3 are included in Table 2.9. Overall,
the risk mitigating actions taken in Scenario 3 result in an approximately 6.5% reduction
in system unreliability.

Table 2.9: Improved second casting source data table.

Description
Casting

Basic Service
(i)
1

Unreliability
(fij )
0.0947

Supplier (j)
30

System
Unreliability
(FS )
0.6259

Mitigation
Cost
$6,427

Figure 2.4: Modiﬁcation to baseline fault tree architecture for Scenario 3.
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Table 2.10: Gate unreliability results updated for Scenario 3.
Gate Number (k)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

2.3.4

Gate Type
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
AND

Gate Unreliability (gkOR , gkAN D )
0.6259
0.2463
0.0466
0.2094
0.2250
0.1328
0.2615
0.1774
0.0389
0.1788
0.0563
0.0800
0.0574
0.2400
0.0233
0.0535
0.0570
0.0624
0.0120

Summary

Table 2.11 includes the output of the fault trees constructed for each of the scenarios
presented and the corresponding estimated costs of mitigating the associated risks. Figure
2.5 illustrates the trade-off between the reduction in risk for each scenario from the baseline
case and the corresponding cost to mitigate the risk.
According to the cost model presented, oversight for the existing casting supplier
(f1,13 = 0.1263) costs the ﬁrm $3,339 annually and is only assumed to maintain the supplier’s current level of unreliability. As a result, the oversight carrying cost of $3,339 is
included in the total mitigation costs of Scenarios 0, 1 and 3. Often, LVHV industries like
those described above use oversight as the primary means in providing a sense of assurance
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in mitigating risks. However, this oversight is primarily compliance-based and targets only
whether or not the ﬁrm is adhering to their standard operating procedures and does not
address the effectiveness or efﬁciency in the ﬁrm’s ability to do so. As a result, oversight
activities do not serve to reduce the ﬁrm’s unreliability, but at best can only be expected to
maintain the current state. Any improvements yielded as a result of oversight are only related to correcting deﬁciencies at the ﬁrm regarding compliance to their standard operating
procedures.

Table 2.11: Summary of results.
System

System

Unreliability

Scenario

Total Mitigation

Unreliability

Scenario

Decision

(FS )

Mitigation Cost

Cost

Improvement

0

Baseline

0.6692

$3,339

$3,339

–

1

Second Equivalent Supplier

0.6274

$7,254

$10,593

6.2%

2a

Improve the Existing Supplier

0.6572

$34,763

$34,763

1.8%

2b

Replace the Existing Supplier

0.6572

$6,427

$6,427

1.8%

3

Second Improved Supplier

0.6259

$6,427

$9,766

6.5%
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Figure 2.5: Tradeoff between risk reduction and mitigation costs for reducing risk.

Introducing a second equivalently performing casting supplier (Scenario 1) provides
a 6.2% improvement in the system reliability. However, doing so will cause the ﬁrm to
outlay an additional $7,254 in mitigation costs beyond the cost of maintaining the existing
supplier ($3,339) for a total mitigation cost of $10,593. Improving the existing supplier
(Scenario 2a) or replacing the existing supplier with an improved supplier (Scenario 2b)
provides the least reduction in the supply chain’s risk, 1.8%, and comes with costs of
$34,763 and $6,427 respectively. The scenario that introduces a second, yet improved,
casting supplier (Scenario 3) appears to provide the greatest reduction in the risk within
the supply chain (6.5%) and at an equivalent cost as replacing the existing supplier with
an improved supplier ($6,427). However, since in this scenario the existing supplier will
remain, their carrying cost must be considered. Thus, the total mitigation cost for Scenario
3 is $9,766. Even after the total cost of mitigation is considered, adding a second improved
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casting supplier provides greater unreliability improvement (6.5% vs. 6.2%) at less cost
($10,593 vs. $9,766) than introducing a second equivalently unreliable casting supplier as
the original.
In summary, since Scenarios 1 and 2a are more expensive when compared to Scenarios
2b and 3, they would be eliminated from consideration by decision makers on the basis
of cost as risk mitigation strategies. Although Scenario 2b is less expensive than Scenario
3, the relative risk reduction is minimal by comparison. As a result, Scenario 3 should be
chosen as the risk mitigation strategy.
2.4

Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter we presented a new application for fault tree analysis that has the poten-

tial of providing sourcing professionals an instrument to build scenarios and make better
informed decisions. In doing so, we studied the supply chain of a thrust bearing used in
an application within a LVHV supply chain. This type of supply chain provides one of the
biggest opportunities to employ such an instrument due to the associated risks, long lead
times, and value of the products being manufactured and constructed. We presented simple
case studies to provide examples of how such an instrument could be beneﬁcial and then
analyzed the results.
Experiments using the methodology illustrated that introducing a redundant supplier
with improved performance provided the greatest reduction in overall risk at a slightly
lower total cost than adding an equivalently unreliable supplier. The assessment methodology allows the practitioner to quantitatively and objectively distinguish between seemingly
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similar options to reduce risk. Thus, less attractive options such as introducing a second
equivalent supplier, improving the existing supplier, providing additional oversight at the
existing supplier or replacing the existing supplier may also have been considered as effective at ﬁrst glance, can be objectively analyzed using our method.
Several areas of future work are planned. The ﬁrst entails the development of a software instrument that has the capability to perform the tasks outlined in this research in an
automated fashion. Such tasks include development of the fault tree from the bill of material, calculation of failure rates and probability, and selection of an optimized scenario of
risk reduction and cost under budgetary constraints. The second includes reﬁnement and
sensitivity analysis with regard to the underlying risk and cost data as well as the associated models used to produce the results presented here. Third, it would be interesting and
useful to further explore several assumptions used in developing our model. For example,
the approach presented assumes that the performance of a supplier is known at the time of
decision-making. However, this may not be the case in practice such as when a supplier
is new to the ﬁrm interested in sourcing product or rendering services from them. The
relaxation of the independence assumption as well as the integration of risk severity and
consequence into the methodology presented here is left for future research. Additionally,
event dependence and the use of minimal cut set analysis in lieu of the simpliﬁed gate calculation approach employed would be useful areas to explore further. Lastly, consideration
for unrepairable events, the unavailability of a supplier’s services, and duration of delays
due to failure and start-up will be considered.
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CHAPTER 3
IDENTIFYING AND MITIGATING SUPPLY CHAIN RISKS USING FAULT TREE
OPTIMIZATION
3.1

Introduction
Firms that produce a low volume of high value goods with long lead times experi-

ence risk in a more signiﬁcant way. According to the World Nuclear Association (www.
world-nuclear.org), building a nuclear power plant costs as much as $14 billion and
takes more than 5 years to complete. Delays to complete the project can cost $1.2 million
per day. In addition, the effort is quite complex. Construction of a nuclear power plant
relies on more than 5,000 individual components that are sourced from hundreds of global
suppliers.
For example, the purchase order for a forging may be placed two years in advance of
it being used in the manufacture of a thrust bearing used in a nuclear power plant. This
lengthy lead time is necessary in order to account for raw material lead times as well as
the production schedule for the forger, which may be only one of a few in the world with
the requisite equipment and qualiﬁcations to make the forging. If a problem is discovered
with the forging at a late stage of manufacturing or delays are experienced due to labor,
equipment, or quality problems with the forger or their raw material sources, the cascading effect can be signiﬁcant. Long lead times, demand for increasingly scarce capabilities,
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and fewer and fewer suppliers that are qualiﬁed to meet the stringent requirements create
signiﬁcant risk for ﬁrms within the nuclear power plant construction supply chain. These
risks are confounded due to the low volume, costly barriers to entry, and relatively infrequent demand, which decentivizes new ﬁrms from participating in the supply chain. Thus,
LVHV ﬁrms like those in the nuclear industry are especially vulnerable to supply chain
risks.
Supply chain risk management (SCRM), which is already an extensively studied topic,
recently became a popular area of interest because supply chains are experiencing greater
exposure to risk. This greater risk is the result of recent changes in how businesses are
being managed. Juttner et al [6] identiﬁed the following business practices that have contributed to these increased risks: (1) a focus on efﬁciency rather than effectiveness, (2)
supply chain globalization, (3) focused factories and centralized distribution, (4) a trend
toward outsourcing, and (5) reduction of the supply base. Many industries, including those
comprised of LVHV supply chains, have experienced an increase in supply chain risks as
a result of these practices.
As a result, an opportunity exists for the development of a quantitative approach that
considers all suppliers within the supply chain as a portfolio and enables supply chain
professionals with the requisite information to identify risks, select suppliers, and deploy
risk mitigating tactics in advance of risks being realized. Some of the current literature in
supply chain risk management addresses these topics. However, not in the same manner
as presented here. With the advancement of enterprise resource planning systems, datadriven decision models have the potential to be implemented in real-time, dynamically,
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and with consideration for cost and resource constraints. The purpose of this research is
to advance prior work by developing such data-driven models. Although all supply chains
could beneﬁt from such an approach, LVHV industries that have high risk exposure would
beneﬁt most from the proposed methods. The unique risk exposure in LVHV supply chains
results from a scarce supply of capable providers, low quantities of demand, signiﬁcant
capital investment, and long lead times to manufacture such goods.
This research extends the work of Sherwin et al. [105] by using a fault tree representation of a LVHV supply chain system to determine how and where to best mitigate
risk in the supply chain . Optimization models are developed to assist decision makers by
identifying the most at-risk suppliers within the supply chain being studied with consideration for budgetary constraints. The approach is ﬂexible and based on the perspective
of the decision maker. For example, a ﬁrm constructing a nuclear power plant may utilize the proposed methodology just as easily as a manufacturer that produces one of the
components that will be installed in the nuclear power plant. More speciﬁcally, the ﬁrm
constructing the nuclear power plant may have the following items on their respective bill
of materials - containment structure, control rods, generator, turbine, fuel rods, etc. Similarly, the proposed models could be used by the manufacturer of the turbine in which case
items such as bearings, seals, and motors that comprise the turbine would be the basis for
the construction of the fault tree. This approach enables a system view of the supply chain
as well as modularity for the user to include and/or exclude portions of the supply chain
during their analysis.
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The primary objective of this research is to construct a model that identiﬁes supplieritem combinations of greatest risk within a supply chain system and subsequently allocates
scarce resources to mitigate those risks. In summary, our research solves this practical
problem and makes the following contributions to the ﬁeld of supply chain risk management:
1. This is the ﬁrst study that addresses risk mitigation in LVHV supply chains. LVHV
supply chains are different than high volume supply chains in that LVHV supply
chains are more susceptible to risk given that ﬁrms with the requisite capabilities
and qualiﬁcations are often more scarce due to signiﬁcant administrative and capital barriers to entry. We utilize fault tree analysis to represent a supply chain as a
portfolio of suppliers and services. The top-level product’s bill of materials serves as
a basis for the fault tree. Subsequently, we derive an optimization model that minimizes portfolio risk and recommends actions external to the ﬁrm to mitigate risks
with consideration for a ﬁrm’s budgetary constraints.
2. Demonstrates the practical application of the above contribution in the form of a case
study to a real and current problem in order to demonstrate the practical application
of the approach in mitigating supply chain risk.
In the next section, we present a literature review of related work followed by a formulation of the models. We then apply the models to solve a problem that faces supply chain
professionals within the nuclear power industry. The chapter concludes with a discussion
of the results.
3.2

Literature Review
Since the early part of the 21st century there has been a signiﬁcant increase in the

number of published papers in the area of supply chain risk modeling [10]. The SCRM
literature contains conceptual, quantitative, and qualitative methodologies applied to four
primary elements of research: identiﬁcation, assessment, mitigation, and responsiveness
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[46]. In this section, we present a review of current literature in those areas of research
most relevant to this research.
With respect to risk identiﬁcation and mitigation, Colicchia and Strozzi [106] identiﬁed
“Complexity & Uncertainty” and “Practices & Tools for Supply Chain Risk Management”
as two of the main themes within SCRM research. More speciﬁcally, the authors point out
that these areas of research are moving from operational risk management to disruption
risk management. Although several papers have been published in these areas within the
past few years, the research has primarily focused on strategic decision making [94], site
location selection [107, 74], inventory stocking levels [69, 65], and transportation decision
models [108] to mitigate risk. Other research has focused on response strategies once a
risk has been realized [109, 110].
Both qualitative and quantitative approaches are proposed in the literature in the areas
of supply chain disruption, reliability, and risk management. Quantitative approaches to
SCRM [111, 112, 94, 33, 113]focus on categorizing supply chain disruptions and analyzing
the major causes of risk in the supply chain. Although useful, qualitative approaches can be
biased by personal opinion, limited by personal experience, and may be more susceptible
to error than quantitative approaches.
In a robust review of operations research and management science models that address
supply chain disruptions, Snyder et al. [114] placed disruptions in the context of other
forms of supply uncertainty (yield uncertainty, capacity uncertainty, lead-time uncertainty,
and input cost uncertainty) and discussed different models for these disruptions. The authors evaluated the methods across six categories - (1) strategic decisions, (2) evaluating
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supply disruptions, (3) sourcing decisions, (4) contracts and incentives, (5) inventory, and
(6) facility location. With respect to the state-of-the-art in modeling disruptions, Snyder et
al. note that most papers model disruptions in an abstract way and commonly assume that
two states exist - normally functioning or disrupted.
In their tutorial on models for designing supply chains resilient to disruptions, Snyder
et. al [73] classify models for reliable supply chain design into three categories - (1) design vs. fortiﬁcation, (2) underlying model, and (3) risk measure. The authors note that
supply chain systems can often be made substantially more reliable with only small additional investments in infrastructure and conclude that most of the existing models use
some variation of a minimum-cost objective. Although minimizing cost is important, the
authors suggest that reliability is important as well. The models developed throughout this
research address these important points made by the authors. First, we include objective
functions that seek to minimize the unreliability (maximize reliability) of the supply chain
system being studied. Second, the models aim to provide decision makers with options to
make investments within the supply chain to mitigate risk with consideration for budgetary
constraints.
With regard to strategies for mitigating disruptions, models that incorporate inventory
control, sourcing strategies, and rerouting contingencies have been proposed [69] as a
means to proactively mitigate risk in a quantitative fashion. Other authors have investigated ﬁnancial risk sharing within a supply chain via contracts, pricing, or competition
[115, 116, 117]. Although research focused on supply chain risk management and related areas has increased in recent years, there is a need for approaches that join both ma51

ture (e.g., tactical/operational planning, demand/supply forecasting) and emergent areas
(e.g., sourcing/supply uncertainty modeling, sustainability risk analysis) [111, 10]. Traditional quantitative OR/MS methodologies such as mixed integer programming [74, 21,
118, 119, 120], stochastic programming [121, 122, 123, 124, 69, 125], fuzzy optimization
[126, 47, 127, 128, 129], and simulation [36, 83, 130] have been applied to solve the supply
chain disruption problem quantitatively. Some quantitative approaches assess probabilities
through surveys of experienced personnel [131, 126] in lieu of empirical data. Ivanov et al.
[132] note that it is almost impossible to determine the probability of endemic-type risks
such as ﬁres, natural disasters, or piracy. Simchi-Levi et al. [133, 134] have developed a
model to determine the impact of a disruption in the supply chain regardless of the cause
or likelihood and use a risk-exposure model to assess the impact of disruptions originating
in an automotive supply chain with a speciﬁc emphasis on low probability risks with high
potential impact. Our approach is to use supplier and item historical data that is available
from a ﬁrm’s enterprise resource planning (ERP) system to assess the overall risk of a supply chain. This alleviates the biases that are inherent with interviews and surveys as well
as the aggregation of the data resulting from those surveys. Further, our approach is not as
heavily weighted as other approaches are on endemic risks and instead focuses on the past
performance of a given supplier to deliver a particular item as an indicator of future risk. In
highly regulated, LVHV (e.g., nuclear power plant construction) where supplier turnover
is low and the use of single and sole sources is high, this is a practical approach.
Similar to Osadchiy et al. [135], our research develops models that analyze the impact of supply network structure on risk. More speciﬁcally, Osadchiy et al. identify three
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mechanisms that can affect the correlation between sales and the state of the economy in
a supply chain network: propagation of systematic risk into production decisions, aggregation of orders from multiple customers in a supply chain network, and aggregation of
orders over time. The primary contribution of the research shows that systemic risk is an
important phenomenon and is affected by supply chain structure. Our approach, based on
the bill of materials of the product being sourced, leverages this concept by deﬁning and
calculating risk as a function of the structure of the supply chain being studied.
Reliability optimization research has been important since the 1960s with a focus on
maximizing system reliability. Approaches have varied and are primarily based on the
system structure and optimization method. [136]. Examples of system structures include
parallel-series systems, general network systems, and k-out-of-n systems. Optimization
methods include redundancy allocation algorithms [137], reliability-redundancy allocation heuristics, multi-objective reliability optimization [138], and optimal assignment of
interchangeable components. More speciﬁc examples of reliability optimization methods
include the use of genetic algorithms [139], simulated annealing [140], and tabu search
[141].
Fault tree analysis was originally developed by Bell Telephone Laboratories in 1961
and has been used extensively in assessing and solving problems related to process hazards,
risk, and system reliability [80]. Although fault tree analysis and reliability optimization
are well developed areas, representing a supply chain system as a fault tree and basing the
fault tree on the supply chain’s bill of materials is a new and novel concept that has not previously been addressed in the literature. In one paper, Klimov and Merkuryev [83] propose
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a quantitative approach to identify risks within a supply chain. In doing so, the authors use
both reliability theory as well as simulation. However, the approach results in the probability of survival for the supply chain, but does not identify speciﬁc suppliers or individual
items as risk mitigation focal points. In some articles, fault tree analysis is used as a tool
for supply chain risk analysis. However, speciﬁc risks within the supply chain are represented as basic events. For example, Senol et al. [142] analyze the failures associated with
ship transportation within a supply chain. Examples of intermediate events within the fault
tree include structural, operational, tank cleaning, and other operational risks. In another
paper, Aqlan and Lam [126] use fault tree analysis to analyze risks within a supply chain
and propose sets of controllable (i.e., capacity constraints, poor planning and scheduling,
technical limitations, design changes, quality issues, etc.) and uncontrollable risk factors
(i.e., wars, terrorism, economic issues, etc.). However, the authors neither construct speciﬁc fault trees nor identify these risks with speciﬁc suppliers like the approach presented
in our research. In other cases [94], where empirical data is not available, judgmental assessments and polling are used to estimate probabilities associated with risks when fault
tree analysis is applied to risk mitigation in supply chains. This approach lends itself to
decisions that are less transparent to management, based on data that is inherent with bias,
and time consuming to collect. We mitigate these biases and inefﬁciencies by introducing
an approach that is based on empirical data available via most ﬁrms’ ERP systems and
extends the previous work of Sherwin et al. [105] by representing a supply chain portfolio
as a fault tree.
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By representing the supply chain as a fault tree, the methodologies outlined in this research provide a portfolio approach to supply chain risk management and demonstrate the
overall unreliability of the system. Subsequently practitioners are able to identify risks and
make tactical decisions at the individual supplier and item level. In addition, we convert the
fault tree structure to a binary decision diagram in order to leverage the computational advantages and improve the accuracy of the resulting reliability parameters [143, 144, 145].
A holistic approach to proactively mitigate risks while considering multiple risk factors is
another important contribution of our work and has been identiﬁed as a gap in the current
research [146, 114]. Our approach is developed in the pages that follow and is applied
to solve a problem in nuclear power plant construction; an industry that relies heavily on
LVHV supply chains.
3.3 Problem Description and Model Formulations
3.3.1 Problem description
The speciﬁc problem that we consider in this research is as follows. A supply chain
manager is allocated a limited budget for reducing supply chain risk. The manager seeks to
use resources as effectively as possible and in doing so determines the speciﬁc suppliers to
target as the subject of mitigation activities. A supplier is mitigated by performing various
actions (e.g., additional oversight is provided, the supplier is engaged in improvement
activities, redundant suppliers are considered), each of which reduce the probability that
the supplier is late and each of which costs resources. The manager seeks to minimize the
unreliability (maximize the reliability) of the entire supply chain while staying within a
prescribed mitigation budget.
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We approach the problem in two ways by formulating nonlinear integer programs that
are subsequently reformulated into linear integer programs with the aim of improving computational efﬁciency. In both models, we use the term unreliability as a measure of risk
and deﬁne it as the probability that a supplier will not deliver their respective good(s) or
service(s) on-time. First, we develop a perfect mitigation model that is aimed at identifying areas of the supply chain that are at-risk. The next model described, which we refer
to as the imperfect mitigation model, extends the perfect mitigation model by identifying
speciﬁc mitigating actions to take on speciﬁc suppliers to improve the overall reliability of
the supply chain portfolio.
3.3.2 Model Formulations
3.3.2.1 Perfect Mitigation Model
Our modeling approach is based on a fault tree structure and starts with the bill of
materials for the supply chain of the top-level item or service being procured [105]. Later,
we will demonstrate this methodology using two top-level items that represent the supply
chains of two ﬁrms within the nuclear industry and speciﬁcally the construction of a nuclear
power plant. The items are (1) a pressurized water reactor (PWR) within the nuclear power
plant and (2) a steam turbine thrust bearing (STTB) that is a component within the nuclear
power plant’s steam turbine. In each case the top-level item’s bill of materials is constructed
and converted into a fault tree. Using both AND and OR gates, we are able to represent
both multi source and single/sole source situations within the supply chain. In addition, the
fault tree approach enables the tiers within the supply chain to be represented. Once the
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fault tree has been formulated, we develop the perfect mitigation model by representing
the top event of the fault tree mathematically.
For the purposes of this research, perfect mitigation occurs when an activity is taken
that sets the reliability of the cut set equal to 100%. In our formulation of the perfect
mitigation model, we assume that failure events (and subsequently minimal cut sets) are
independent. This is a practical assumption given that the factors that affect delays within
a LVHV manufacturing supply chain have been shown not to have a high degree of correlation [105]. By assuming mutually independent events, we are able to apply Boolean
algebraic operations and calculate the probability of occurrence that at least one mode of
failure (i.e., minimal cut set) within the fault tree will occur [81]. As a result, the probability of the top event (i.e., failure) of the fault tree can be stated as 1

Q

i2I (1

Ui ) where

Ui ) is the probability that cut set i does not occur and I is the set of all minimal cut

(1
sets.

The objective function (Eq. (3.1)) is formulated as a nonlinear integer program based
on the above assumption and using the binomial decision variable xi that is 1 if minimal
cut set i 2 I is mitigated and 0 otherwise. Cut sets are linked to basic events (suppliers) via
the model constraints and speciﬁcally a second binomial variable yj which is 1 if supplier
j 2 J is mitigated and 0 otherwise and J is the set of all basic events (suppliers). Ji
represents the set of suppliers that are members of cut set i. A budget value, b, is included
in the formulation and represents the total mitigation budget of the ﬁrm and is compared to
the cost, cj , of mitigating supplier j. The basis for cj and its extension cjk are discussed in
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a later section. Given this notation, the objective of minimizing the supply chain reliability
can be represented as follows:

Minimize

Y

1

Ui ) 1

(1

xi

(3.1)

i2I

By converting the minimization to maximization and taking the logarithm of the objective function, the perfect mitigation model is formulated as follows:

Maximize

X

log(1

i2I

s.t.

xi 
X
j2J

X

j2Ji

Ui )(1

xi )

yj 8i 2 I

cj yj  b

(3.2)
(3.3)
(3.4)

Equation (3.3) enforces that a minimal cut set can only be mitigated if at least one of
its suppliers is mitigated and (3.4) enforces a budget for supplier mitigation. As mentioned
above, this model assumes that if a supplier is mitigated then it cannot fail, an impractical
assumption in many cases. In even the best circumstances, it is rare that a supplier will
become perfectly reliable after completing mitigation actions. As a result, the perfect
mitigation model computes a best-case bound and can serve as a means for practitioners to
identify the areas of highest risk within the supply chain portfolio.
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3.3.2.2

Imperfect Mitigation Model

Whereas the perfect mitigation model describes perfect supplier intervention, we now
introduce an imperfect mitigation model that selects individual suppliers to mitigate within
cut sets. In this scenario, supplier intervention reduces, but does not eliminate, the chance
of supplier unreliability. Examples of such intervention activities that we will explore
include taking action to improve the existing supplier’s reliability, replace the supplier
with an improved supplier, provide additional oversight to assist the supplier, or take no
mitigation action at all. All of the supplier-speciﬁc activities described are intended to
have a favorable impact on the overall reliability of the supply chain system and represent
activities that are applied in industry settings.
For the imperfect mitigation model we convert the fault tree that represents the supply
chain system into a binary decision diagram. This approach leverages the computational
advantages of the binary decision diagram structure as well as more effectively models
the problem such that individual suppliers can be identiﬁed as targets for risk mitigation
activities that result in an overall improvement of the supply chain system reliability.
For the purpose of this research, we apply the component connection method [147] for
converting a fault tree into a binary decision diagram. The process consists of three primary
steps: (1) ordering, (2) construction/connection, and (3) simpliﬁcation. For basic events
that are connected through AND gates, the corresponding nodes on the binary decision
diagram are connected to each other through the 1 branch of the node. Alternatively, for
basic events that are connected via OR gates, the nodes that represent the basic events on
the binary decision diagram are connected to each other on the 0 branch of the node. Figure
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3.1 illustrates the conversion of a simple fault tree into a binary decision diagram using the
component connection method. In this example, the fault tree contains four basic events
(A, B, C, and D), one OR gate (Gate 1), and one AND gate (Gate 2). The subsequent
binary decision diagram consists of ﬁve terminal 1 node paths.

Figure 3.1: Example of converting a fault tree to a binary decision diagram.

The resulting binary decision diagram consists of nodes that represent basic events and
have associated probabilities of success (reliability) and failure (unreliability). Success
paths are connected via 0 branches and failure paths are connected via 1 branches. Paths
consist of the sequence of connections between basic events and terminate at either a terminal 1 node or a terminal 0 node and represent the cut sets within the fault tree. Paths that
lead to a terminal 1 node specify the basic events (suppliers) for the top event (i.e., failure)
in the fault tree to occur. If redundancies within the binary decision diagram have been
removed, the basic events (suppliers) contained within a path terminating in a terminal 1
node lie along the fault tree’s minimal cut sets [148]. Conversely, the paths that terminate
in a terminal 0 node indicate top event nonoccurence (or success/reliability).
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We deﬁne Pj,`(j,!) as the probability of supplier j in path ! with state ` where ` = 0
if success state and ` = 1 if failed state. `(j, !) is the state of supplier j in path !.
Hereafter, the notation Pj,`(j,!) is simpliﬁed and equivalent to Pj,! . Let ⌦ be the set of all
terminal 1 node paths. Using the binary decision diagram approach, for a given terminal
1 path ! we can multiply the probabilities of all suppliers contained within that path (J! )
to obtain the probability of that path. Subsequently we can take the summation across all
terminal 1 paths to compute the top event (system) unreliability. For the example presented
in Figure 3.1, the resulting top event unreliability can be computed as

P

!2⌦

Q

j2J!

Pj,!

where ⌦ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, J1 = {A, B}, J2 = {A, B, C}, J3 = {A, B, C, D}, J4 =
{A, C}, J5 = {A, D}, and the probability of supplier j in path ! is a value dependent
upon one of two states, ` = {0, 1}.
The imperfect mitigation model (see Eq. (3.5)) is developed similarly and based on
the binary decision diagram that has been converted from the fault tree that represents the
supply chain structure being analyzed. The objective function is formulated as a nonlinear
integer program, and seeks to minimize the overall unreliability of the supply chain system.
We leverage the straightforward reliability computations of the binary decision diagram
and introduce an index k to represent the mitigation activity performed on a supplier. More
speciﬁcally, Pj,!,k is the probability of supplier j along path ! given mitigation activity k
was performed on j. A binary decision variable yjk is introduced and represents whether
or not supplier j is mitigated using action k. The selection of mitigation activity k reduces
the probability, but does not necessarily reduce the probability to 0 and in one case deﬁned
later, results in no change to the probability. Subsequently, taking the summation across
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all terminal 1 paths (! 2 ⌦) within the binary decision diagram results in the top event
unreliability. The objective function,

P

!2⌦

Q

j2J!

Q

y

k2K

jk
Pj,!,k
, represents the summation

of the product of the probability of the path sets within the binary decision diagram being
studied.
Two constraints are incorporated into the model (see Eq. (3.6)-(3.7)). The ﬁrst is a
budgetary constraint (b). The second constraint assures that, if selected, a supplier (j) is
only subject to one mitigation activity (k).
In the imperfect mitigation model formulation, we extend the cost function values (cjk )
used in Equation (3.6) speciﬁc to the mitigation activity chosen. By taking this approach,
we are able to choose the optimal portfolio of mitigation activities to take with individual
suppliers that minimizes the unreliability of the supply chain system being studied within
the budgetary constraints set by the ﬁrm. We have chosen four potential mitigation activities that are currently used within the nuclear industry to illustrate the concept in this
research. The activities are as follows: (1) improve the existing supplier (k = 1), (2) replace the existing supplier with an improved supplier (k = 2), (3) increase oversight at the
supplier (k = 3), and (4) do not take any mitigation action (k = 4). This is an advantage
of the approach described here in that it allows for additional activities as well as the associated cost functions to be customized to the industry and supply chain portfolio being
analyzed. Thus, the model formulation is as follows.
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Maximize

XY Y

y

jk
Pj,!,k

(3.5)

!2⌦ j2J! k2K

s.t.

X
j2J

X

cjk yjk  b

(3.6)

yjk = 1

(3.7)

k2K

Next, we present a linearized reformulation of the imperfect mitigation model. In doing
!
so we introduce the variable wrk
, which we will refer to as the partial probability associated

with each path (!) where k is the mitigation activity select and r is the order of the supplier
!
= Pj(1,!),`(1,!),k(1,!) Pj(2,!),`(2,!),k(2,!) ...Pj(r,!),`(r,!),k(r,!)
within the given path. The variable wrk

represents the probability that the ﬁrst r suppliers within path ! realize the respective state
(`) assigned to them within the path given that k is the mitigation level for rth supplier j in
path !. Equations (3.8) - (3.13) outline the linearized reformulation of the imperfect mitigation model. The objective function (3.8) is the summation of the partial probability for
the last supplier in the path across all paths in the BDD and all mitigation activities. The
ﬁrst constraint (3.9) is the probability of the ﬁrst member (r = 1) of each path and incorporates the decision variable, yj(1,!),k . For each path, the second constraint (3.10) identiﬁes
!
the rth partial probability (wrk
for some value of k) as the product of the (r

probability (wr!

1,k

1)th partial

for some value of k) and the probability that the rth supplier is in state

` on the path (Pj(r,!),`(r,!),k(r,!) for some value of k); this “chain” starts with the second
supplier in the path and continues to the last supplier. In this way, the partial probability
of the last supplier in path ! (w|!J! |,k ) is the product of the state probabilities of all of the
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suppliers in the path. The third constraint (3.11) assures that for each path ! the partial
!
probability wrk
is always non-negative and is positive only for the value of r and k such that

yj(r,!),k = 1. The fourth constraint (3.12) serves as the budgetary constraint and the ﬁfth
constraint (3.13) assures that only one mitigation activity (k) is selected for each supplier
(j).

Maximize

XX

w|!J! |,k

X

1,k

!2⌦ k2K

s.t.

(3.8)

!
w1k
= Pj(1,!),`(1,!),k(1,!) yj(1,!),k 8k 2 K; ! 2 ⌦

wr!

=

k2K

X

k2K

1
Pj(r,!),`(r,!),k(r,!)

j2J

X

(3.10)

8! 2 ⌦; 8j 2 J; r = 2, ..., |J! |

!
wrk
 yj(r,!),k

X

!
wrk

(3.9)

8j 2 J; k 2 K; ! 2 ⌦

(3.11)

cjk yjk  b

(3.12)

yjk = 1

(3.13)

k2K

The rationale for this linearized model is as follows. Let kj⇤ be the mitigation level
selected for supplier j in the optimal solution (i.e., the value of k for which yjk = 1).
Then the recursive equations are as follows where Equation (3.14) represents the partial
probability of the ﬁrst (r = 1) supplier in each path (!) and Equation (3.15) represents
the partial probabilities of each path (!) inclusive of all suppliers (|J! |) within the path
beginning with the second (r = 2) supplier in the path.
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!
w1k
⇤ (1) = Pj(1,!),`(1,!),k ⇤ (1,!)

Pj(r,!),`(r,!),k⇤ (r,!) wr

1,k⇤ (r 1)

(3.14)

!2⌦
!
= wrk
⇤ (r)

r = 2, ..., |J! | ; ! 2 ⌦

As an example, suppose that we mitigate supplier r

(3.15)

1 by choosing k = 2 and supplier

r by choosing mitigation activity k = 1. It follows that:

wr!

1,1

+ wr!

1,2

=

1
Pj(r,!),`(r,!),1

!
wr1
+

1
Pj(r,!),`(r,!),2

!
wr2

r = 2, ..., |J! | ; ! 2 ⌦
(3.16)

Because wr!

1,1

= 0 and wr!2 = 0,

wr!

1,2

=

1
Pj(r,!),`(r,!),1

!
wr1

r = 2, ..., |J! | ; ! 2 ⌦

(3.17)

Rearranging Equation (3.17) yields the recursive equation in the format shown in Equation (3.15):

Pj(r,!),`(r,!),1 wr

1,2

!
= wr1
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r = 2, ..., |J! | ; ! 2 ⌦

(3.18)

3.4

Motivating Example: Nuclear Power Plant Supply Chain
In order to demonstrate the application of our approach to supply chain risk mitigation,

we illustrate the model with an example from the nuclear power industry. According to
the World Nuclear Association (www.oecd-nea.org) [3], the total value of nuclear
power plant construction globally between 2014 and 2030 is estimated at $1.23 trillion and
will rely on approximately $575 billion in international procurements. According to the
same report, 295 new nuclear power plants were either under construction or planned as of
March 11, 2014. With continued emphasis on green energy as a means to stabilize CO2
emissions worldwide, nuclear energy is viewed as a clean energy source that continues to
be sought after by many countries.
Aside from the severity of adverse events that may result from nuclear energy, several
factors exist that make nuclear energy a cost prohibitive solution. A primary factor is the
requirements and standards required to enter the nuclear supply chain. As a result, many
suppliers are not interested in entering the supply chain. In turn, companies responsible
for constructing and maintaining nuclear power plants are faced with a limited supply base
to produce critical, large, and expensive items. The quality and reliability of these items
are essential to the safe operation of the nuclear power plant. Furthermore, delays in the
delivery of these products to the construction site can result in losses estimated at $1.2
million per day [149]. In the summer of 2017, construction at the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Generating Station near Jenkinsville, SC was abandoned due to a number of factors,
including the deterioration of a “robust supply chain” within the industry over the past 30
years [150].
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In 2014, the industry identiﬁed two primary challenges for nuclear power to remain
competitive [3]: (1) ensuring that the economics of nuclear power are competitive with
other generating sources and (2) reliable international supply chains are developed that
are capable of delivering high quality products. The research presented here addresses the
latter, which is directly related to the overall competitiveness of nuclear power generation.
In the sections that follow, the models presented above are applied at two levels within
the same supply chain. The ﬁrst level analyzes the basic supply chain used in nuclear power
plant construction using the proposed methods. The second level supply chain is based on
the perspective of a supplier to the ﬁrm constructing the nuclear power plant and consists
of a turbine, which is a key component used within the nuclear power plant. This approach
demonstrates the robustness of the application of our methodology in that it applies equally
well to ﬁrms at various levels of the same supply chain.
3.4.1

Supply chain deﬁnition

We have chosen the construction of a nuclear power plant and the manufacture of one
of the components used in the manufacture of one of the primary items within the power
plant to demonstrate the methods outlined in this research. More speciﬁcally, we have
chosen a pressurized water reactor as the basis for the bill of materials of the nuclear
power plant because several pressurized water reactor power plants are being constructed
worldwide. Further, our focus is on the primary items sourced for the plant. We exclude
building materials and other items in order to simplify the application. Figure 3.2 shows
a schematic of a pressurized water reactor and its primary items [151]. We will include
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the following items in the bill of materials used in our analysis in the pages that follow:
containment structure, pressurizer, steam generator, control rods, reactor vessel, turbine,
generator, and condenser.

Figure 3.2: Schematic of a pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant.

One of the primary items in the pressurized water reactor is the steam turbine. Within
the reactor vessel, the core creates heat. The heat is then transferred via the primary coolant
loop to the steam generator where water is vaporized and produces steam. The steam is directed to the main turbine, causing it to turn the turbine generator, which results in electrical
power production. [152] Steam turbine designs vary. However, the primary components of
a steam turbine include the casing, valves, a rotor containing blades, diaphragms, nozzles,
and a host of other auxiliary equipment that comprise the turbine system. Examples of
auxiliary equipment include thrust bearings, journal bearings, couplings, and lubricating
systems. For the purposes of this study, we will examine a steam turbine thrust bearing.
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Figure 3.3 outlines the ﬂow of the bills of material for the pressurized water reactor,
steam turbine, and thrust bearing that will be used in the computational studies that follow.
In the section that follows, we develop the fault trees and binary decision diagrams that
represent the pressurized water reactor and thrust bearing supply chains. The examples
that follow demonstrate the robustness of our approach at various levels of a supply chain
as well as the ﬂexibility that the approach provides in assessing, identifying, and mitigating
risks at various levels of a supply chain.

Figure 3.3: Bills of material.

3.4.2

Fault tree and binary decision diagram formulation

We introduce a fault tree and subsequently a binary decision diagram to represent each
of the supply chains described above - the supply chain used to construct the pressurized
water reactor and the supply chain used to manufacture a thrust bearing used in the steam
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turbine, which is a primary component of the pressurized water reactor. For both the pressurized water reactor and thrust bearing supply chains, we take the perspective of the two
ﬁrms responsible for outsourcing the respective goods and services. The two fault trees
and two binary decision diagrams are built from the perspectives of those two ﬁrms. Basic events in the fault trees represent the primary goods and services being procured by
the ﬁrm. Intermediate events are used where necessary to group lower-tier suppliers that
provide more complex goods and services. The presence of dual sources (i.e., redundant
suppliers) of a good and/or service are connected via AND gates. Although present within
LVHV supply chains, redundancies are not common in practice and sourcing from more
than two suppliers for the same good and/or service is rare. A binary decision diagram
is formulated from the fault tree for the supply chain being studied using the component
connection method in order to leverage the mathematical modeling advantages of binary
decision diagrams [147]. Although calculating the top event probability from a fault tree
is an acceptable method, doing so often requires the use of approximations and therefore,
large inaccuracies may exist depending on the magnitude of the individual event probabilities and/or the size of the underlying fault tree. Even though fault trees are a preferred way
to illustrate the causes of failure, the use of binary decision diagrams overcome the potential inaccuracies associated with calculating failure probabilities from a fault tree [143].
3.4.2.1

Pressurized water reactor

For the pressurized water reactor supply chain, we take the perspective of the construction ﬁrm responsible for sourcing the primary goods and services for the pressurized water
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reactor. In the examples presented, we assume that multiple pressurized water reactors
are being built simultaneously. As a result, dual-sourcing positions across the multiple
pressurized water reactor construction sites exist for some, but not all of the goods and
services being procured by the construction ﬁrm. The pressurized water reactor supply
chain consists of the eight primary goods and services provided by eleven suppliers. Redundant suppliers are utilized for the control rods, the reactor vessels, and the condensers.
Table 3.1 outlines the suppliers (j), their respective goods and services, and the supplier’s
unreliability (uj ). The unreliability numbers presented here are synthetic, but reﬂective of
unreliabilities experienced within the nuclear industry.

Table 3.1: Pressurized water reactor supply chain data.
Supplier (j)

Good and/or Service

Supplier unreliability (uj )

1

Containment structure

0.0031

2

Pressurizer

0.0236

3

Steam generator

0.0489

4

Control rods

0.0023

5

Control rods

0.0215

6

Reactor vessel

0.0441

7

Reactor vessel

0.0263

8

Turbine

0.0347

9

Generator

0.0088

10

Condenser

0.0288

11

Condenser

0.0411

The resulting fault tree for the pressurized water reactor can be found in Figure 3.4.
Each of the goods and services provided are represented by basic events and the respective
suppliers that provided them. Basic events that are inputs to the three AND gates in the
fault tree include control rods, the reactor vessel, and the condenser. AND gates represent
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situations where the ﬁrm constructing the pressurized water reactor has chosen dual source
options. The containment structure, pressurizer, steam generator, turbine, and generator
are being provided by single sources of supply in this example and the basic events that
represent them are connected via OR gates in the fault tree.

Figure 3.4: Pressurized water reactor fault tree.

A total of eight cut sets (i = 1, ..., 8) result from the pressurized water reactor fault tree.
Each cut set is a minimal cut set, which represents an event or series of events whose occurrence will result in the realization of the top event of the fault tree [102]. Speciﬁc to the
application being discussed, the failure of the individual suppliers or the joint combination
of the suppliers within a cut set to provide their respective good and service would result in
the failure of the pressurized water reactor reactor being constructed on time. By assuming independence of failures between suppliers, we can apply the rules of Boolean algebra
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and multiply the unreliabilities of the suppliers represented by the basic events within each
cut set, which results in the unreliability of each cut set (Ui ). By applying the rare event
approximation (uj < 0.1) [102] and given that the top event unreliability is the union of
the minimal cut sets, we can sum the individual minimal cut set unreliabilities to obtain the
unreliability of the top event in the fault tree, USREA =

P

Ui , where US is the unreliability

of the system being studied and REA denotes that US was calculated using the rare event
approximation. Likewise, the reliability of the system, RS , is equivalent to 1

US . As a

result, we are able to obtain the unreliability of constructing the pressurized water reactor
on-time. In the case of the data presented in Table 3.1 this results in a pressurized water
reactor unreliability of UPREA
W R = 0.1215. Table 3.2 includes the minimal cut sets and resulting unreliabilities for the pressurized water reactor fault tree. The • indicates an AND gate
and + (not shown in the reduced form illustrated in Table 3.2) indicates an OR gate. To
calculate cut set unreliability, we use Boolean algebra where the unreliabilities of events
(suppliers) within the same minimal cut sets connected by AND gates are multiplied by
one another and those connected by OR gates are added to one another.
Next, we construct a binary decision diagram using the component connection method.
The binary decision diagram structure is used as input to the imperfect mitigation models as described above. Using the binary decision diagram provides a mathematically and
computationally efﬁcient means to identify speciﬁc basic events (suppliers) within the fault
tree structure and update the overall system unreliability/reliability. Figure 3.5 is a graphical representation of the binary decision diagram based on the fault tree shown in Figure
3.4 where nodes represent suppliers.
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Table 3.2: Pressurized water reactor fault tree minimal cut set data.
Minimal Cut Set

Cut Set

(i)

Suppliers (j)

Unreliability (Ui )

1

1

0.0031

2

2

0.0236

3

3

0.0489

4

4•5

0.0000

5
6

6•7

0.0012

8

0.0347

7

9

0.0088

8

10 • 11

0.0012

P

Ui =

0.1215

Figure 3.5: Binary decision diagram for pressurized water reactor fault tree.
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3.4.2.2

Steam turbine thrust bearings

Steam turbine thrust bearings are used as a primary component in the steam turbine
(j = 8 in the pressurized water reactor fault tree). In constructing the fault tree for the
thrust bearing, we take the perspective of the ﬁrm who is the supplier to the steam turbine
manufacturer. In our example, the thrust bearing manufacturer’s supply chain consists of
44 suppliers (see Table 3.3 for individual supplier unreliabilities) and the resulting fault
tree consists of 31 gates, which is shown in Figure 3.6.
Figures 3.6 - 3.11 illustrate the supply chains as fault trees for the items used in the
manufacture of the thrust bearing. These items include the thrust shoe, bracket, leveling
links, and support ring. Thrust shoes are sourced from two separate suppliers. The use of
an AND gate (Gate No. 2) describes this situation within the fault tree. All other top-level
items (bracket, leveling links, support ring) are procured from single or sole sources. This
situation is represented by an OR gate (Gate No. 1) in the top-level fault tree (Figure 3.6).
Likewise, within the lower-level fault trees (Figures 3.7-3.11), the use of AND gates and
OR gates are used to describe redundant and single/sole source positions respectively.
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Table 3.3: Steam turbine thrust bearing supply chain data.
Supplier (j)

Good and/or Service

Unreliability (uj )

Supplier (j)

Good and/or Service

Unreliability (uj )

1

Plating

0.0195

23

Lab & Test

0.0199

2

Lab & Test

0.0424

24

Melt Stock

0.0178

3

Machining

0.0379

25

Lab & Test

0.0322

4

Machining

0.0419

26

Heat Treatment

0.0492

5

Casting

0.0203

27

Heat Treatment

0.0157

6

Forging

0.0450

28

Machining

0.0422

7

Lab & Test

0.0323

29

Casting

0.0065

8

Heat Treatment

0.0081

30

Casting

0.0062

9

Melt Stock

0.0092

31

Lab & Test

0.0276

10

Lab & Test

0.0433

32

Heat Treatment

0.0097

11

Plating

0.0459

33

Heat Treatment

0.0129

12

Lab & Test

0.0316

34

Melt Stock

0.0147

13

Machining

0.0009

35

Lab & Test

0.0190

14

Casting

0.0472

36

Machining

0.0343

15

Casting

0.0062

37

Machining

0.0328

16

Lab & Test

0.0454

38

Casting

0.0049

17

Heat Treatment

0.0332

39

Forging

0.0107

18

Melt Stock

0.0016

40

Forging

0.0010

19

Lab & Test

0.0475

41

Heat Treatment

0.0425

20

Forging

0.0362

42

Heat Treatment

0.0358

21

Machining

0.0189

43

Melt Stock

0.0484

22

Casting

0.0114

44

Lab & Test

0.0095
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Figure 3.6: Steam turbine thrust bearing manufacturer top-level fault tree.

Figure 3.7: Thrust shoe supply chain (Source A).
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Figure 3.8: Thrust shoe supply chain (Source B).

Figure 3.9: Bracket supply chain (Source C).
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Figure 3.10: Leveling link supply chain (Source D).

Figure 3.11: Support ring supply chain (Source E).
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A total of 99 minimal cut sets are contained within the thrust bearing fault tree, which
is comprised of 44 suppliers representing the supply chain used to manufacture the thrust
bearing. We again apply the rare event approximation and apply the rules of Boolean
algebra. The resulting steam turbine thrust bearing supply chain system unreliability is
REA
UST
T B = 0.3128. In other words, the steam turbine thrust bearing supply chain has a

31.28% probability of failure. This translates to a 31.28% probability of not being completed on-time as the result of delivery failures within the supply chain. Table 3.4 summarizes the unreliability data of the steam turbine thrust bearing supply chain fault tree
minimal cut sets.
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Table 3.4: Steam turbine thrust bearing fault tree minimal cut set data.
Cut Set
Minimal

Suppliers

Cut Set

Unreliability

Minimal

Suppliers

Cut Set

Unreliability

Minimal

Suppliers

Unreliability

Cut Set (i)

(j)

(Ui )

Cut Set (i)

(j)

(Ui )

Cut Set (i)

(j)

(Ui )

1

1•11

0.00089505

34

9•20

0.00033304

67

7•18

0.00005168

2

1•12

0.00061620

35

9•16

0.00041768

68

7•19

0.00153425

3

1•13

0.00001755

36

9•17

0.00030544

69

7•14•15

0.00000945

4

1•18

0.00003120

37

10•11

0.00198747

70

7•20

0.00116926

5

1•19

0.00092625

38

10•12

0.00136828

71

7•16

0.00146642

6

1•14•15

0.00000571

39

10•13

0.00003897

72

7•17

0.00107236

7

1•20

0.00070590

40

10•18

0.00006928

73

8•11

0.00037179

8

1•16

0.00088530

41

10•19

0.00205675

74

8•12

0.00025596

9

1•17

0.00064740

42

10•14•15

0.00001267

75

8•13

0.00000729

10

2•11

0.00194616

43

10•20

0.00156746

76

8•18

0.00001296

11

2•12

0.00133984

44

10•16

0.00196582

77

8•19

0.00038475

12

2•13

0.00003816

45

10•17

0.00143756

78

8•14•15

0.00000237

13

2•18

0.00006784

46

5•11

0.00093177

79

8•20

0.00029322

14

2•19

0.00201400

47

5•12

0.00064148

80

8•16

0.00036774

15

2•14•15

0.00001241

48

5•13

0.00001827

81

8•17

0.00026892

16

2•20

0.00153488

49

5•18

0.00003248

82

21

0.01890000

17

2•16

0.00192496

50

5•19

0.00096425

83

24

0.01780000

18

2•17

0.00140768

51

5•14•15

0.00000594

84

25

0.03220000

19

3•4•11

0.00007289

52

5•20

0.00073486

85

22

0.01140000

20

3•4•12

0.00005018

53

5•16

0.00092162

86

23

0.01990000

21

3•4•13

0.00000143

54

5•17

0.00067396

87

26 • 27

0.00077244

22

3•4•18

0.00000254

55

6•11

0.00206550

88

28

0.04220000

23

3•4•19

0.00007543

56

6•12

0.00142200

89

31

0.02760000

24

3•4•14•15

0.00000046

57

6•13

0.00004050

90

32

0.00970000

25

3•4•20

0.00005749

58

6•18

0.00007200

91

29 • 30

0.00004030

26

3•4•16

0.00007210

59

6•19

0.00213750

92

33

0.01290000

27

3•4•17

0.00005272

60

6•14•15

0.00001317

93

34 • 35

0.00027930

28

9•11

0.00042228

61

6•20

0.00162900

94

36 • 37

0.00112504

29

9•12

0.00029072

62

6•16

0.00204300

95

43

0.04840000

30

9•13

0.00000828

63

6•17

0.00149400

96

44

0.00950000

31

9•18

0.00001472

64

7•11

0.00148257

97

38

0.00490000

32

9•19

0.00043700

65

7•12

0.00102068

98

39 • 40

0.00001070

33

9•14•15

0.00000269

66

7•13

0.00002907

99

41 • 42

0.00152150

P

81

Ui =

0.31292916

Figure 3.12 shows a portion of the overall binary decision diagram developed from
the steam turbine thrust bearing fault tree and speciﬁcally the suppliers that comprise the
thrust shoe supply chain (see Figure 3.7). After applying simpliﬁcation rules [147], the
steam turbine thrust bearing binary decision diagram consists of a total of 99 paths.

Figure 3.12: Binary decision diagram for steam turbine thrust bearing thrust shoe (see
Figure 3.7).

3.4.3

Mitigation Cost

The cost of mitigating the risks of supplier j is a function of the time estimated for
mitigation activity (k) and the hourly rate of personnel to complete the activity (h = $104

82

per hour [104]). The respective costs used for the four mitigation activities available are
described in Table 3.5 and were estimated empirically based on industry knowledge.

Table 3.5: Cost function values.
Mitigation Activity

k

Improve the existing supplier
Replace supplier with an improved supplier
Increase oversight at existing supplier
No mitigation activity

1
2
3
4

Reliability
Improvement
15%
25%
5%
0%

cjk
$12,209
$27,737
$10,816
$0

One restriction of the perfect mitigation model is that only one mitigation strategy/activity
is permitted per supplier. In order to maintain consistency between the perfect mitigation
model and the imperfect mitigation model for comparison purposes, we have set the mitigation cost (cj ) in the perfect mitigation model to $12,209, which is equivalent to cj 1 in the
imperfect mitigation model even though the functions described in Table 3.5 do not apply
to the perfect mitigation model.
3.5

Computational Results
For the supply chains described above, we run the respective models outlined using

data representative of the suppliers of goods and services for the LVHV industry being
described. The computational results are presented in a fashion relevant to the supply
chain professional who, with a limited budget, will be challenged with minimizing risk
across the supply chain system he/she is managing. As a result, each model is run at
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$10,000 budgetary increments up to a maximum budget of $300,000 or an overall system
reliability of 100% (0% unreliability), whichever comes ﬁrst. Results are presented as a
Pareto frontier and demonstrate the optimal tradeoff between the budget allocation and
resulting reliability of the supply chain system being analyzed.
Both the pressurized water reactor and steam turbine thrust bearing supply chains
are analyzed in the pages that follow utilizing each of the modeling approaches outlined
throughout this research. In the sections that follow, we analyze the computational results
of the respective models.
3.5.1

Perfect Mitigation

Here, we analyze the supply chains using the perfect mitigation model described in
Equations (3.2) - (3.4). Figure 3.13 demonstrates the tradeoff between the system reliability and mitigation cost for both the pressurized water reactor and steam turbine thrust
bearing supply chains independently. Prior to investing in mitigation activities, the reliability of the pressurized water reactor and steam turbine thrust bearing supply chains were
M
P MM
RPP M
W R = 0.8837 and RST T B = 0.7285 respectively. At successive levels of investment,

the reliability of each supply chain system increases as expected. The pressurized water
reactor supply chain achieves 100% reliability at a cost of $109,881. The steam turbine
thrust bearing does not achieve 100% reliability prior to exhausting the $300,000 maximum
budget. Instead, the thrust bearing supply chain sees a maximum reliability of 99.98% at
a total cost of $293,016. In both cases, the marginal improvement in system reliability
decreases with increasing investment in mitigation activity. This information could prove
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quite important to a practitioner responsible for allocating resources to minimizing risk
within a supply chain. For example, a supply chain manager might determine that budgeting $150,000 to increase the reliability of the thrust bearing supply chain is satisfactory
given that the resulting improvement in reliability (to 95.12%) is sufﬁcient.

Figure 3.13: System reliability improvement as a function of mitigation budget (perfect
mitigation model).

Figures 3.14 and 3.15 visually represent the optimal cut sets whose probabilities have
been nulliﬁed and contains the suppliers selected to mitigate for each formulation and
supply chain. In the case of the pressurized water reactor, minimal cut set 4 is not chosen.
This is reasonable given the fact that the cut set is already 100% reliable without any
mitigation. Minimal cut sets 6, 24, 33, 51, 78, 91, and 98 are not chosen by the model
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in the thrust bearing supply chain system. Similar to minimal cut set 4 in the pressurized
water reactor supply chain, the minimal cut sets not chosen in the thrust bearing supply
chain have unreliability values nearing 100% (Ui ⇠ 0.0000). Thus, taking mitigating
actions would provide nearly no marginal beneﬁt to the system’s overall reliability.

Figure 3.14: Minimal cut sets mitigated in pressurized water reactor supply chain.
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Figure 3.15: Minimal cut sets mitigated in steam turbine thrust bearing supply chain.
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3.5.2

Imperfect Mitigation

Equations (3.8) - (3.13) develop the formulation of the linearized imperfect mitigation model used to analyze the pressurized water reactor and steam turbine thrust bearing
supply chains. Prior to investment or taking any mitigating actions, the system reliabilities of the pressurized water reactor and steam turbine thrust bearing supply chains were
M
IM M
RIM
P W R = 0.8836 and RST T B = 0.7982. Figure 3.16 illustrates the tradeoff between

increasing investments in mitigating activities and the improvement in supply chain reliability. At a total mitigation budget of $300,000 neither of the supply chains had achieved
M
IM M
100% system reliability (RIM
P W R = 0.9122, RST T B = 0.8354). Figure 3.17 illustrates

the suppliers and mitigation activities selected as a function of increasing investment in
risk mitigation activities for the pressurized water reactor supply chain. In the case of the
imperfect mitigation model, risk mitigation activities are chosen for each supplier in the
supply chain. Those activities are as follows: (1) improve the existing supplier (k = 1),
(2) replace the existing supplier with a new and improved supplier (k = 2), (3) increase
the ﬁrm’s oversight at the existing supplier (k = 3), or (4) take no mitigation activity at all
(k = 4). The speciﬁc investment costs for each activity and the assumed improvement of
the supplier as a result of taking the respective mitigation action can be found in Table 3.5.
Optimal mitigation activities chosen for the steam turbine thrust bearing supply chain are
shown in Figure 3.17.
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Figure 3.16: System reliability improvement as a function of mitigation cost (imperfect
mitigation model).
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(a) Pressurized water reactor.

(b) Steam turbine thrust bearing.

Figure 3.17: Mitigation activities selected as a function of mitigation budget.
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Similar to the perfect mitigation model, the tradeoff between mitigation investment and
improvement in overall supply chain system reliability is useful to a practitioner. Compared to the perfect mitigation model, the imperfect mitigation model provides additional
ﬂexibility since mitigation activities for individual suppliers are are chosen by the model.
As a result, improvements in system reliability based on speciﬁc actions are observed up
to the maximum budget allocated ($300,000) and the practitioner is left to decide if the
incremental investment is worth the additional improvement.
The additional ﬂexibility that the imperfect mitigation model provides a supply chain
practitioner is evident in the activities chosen by the model. Generally, if mitigation funds
are available, the model seeks to maximize the use of those funds for a corresponding
maximum beneﬁt in system reliability. As a result, the mitigation activities chosen and
the suppliers chosen to mitigate change at increasing budgetary levels depending on the
cost-reliability tradeoff; a pattern that is observed in both the pressurized water reactor and
steam turbine generator supply chains.
3.5.3

Comparison of Mitigation Models and Formulations

When comparing the supply chain system reliabilities generated by the perfect and
imperfect mitigation models, the differences can be attributed to the underlying models.
More speciﬁcally, the perfect mitigation model uses a fault tree and subsequently minimal cut sets as its basis. Consequently, the assumptions that underly fault trees and the
Boolean algebra used to calculate the top event reliabilities are also assumed in the perfect
mitigation model. The differences observed in our computational examples are practicable
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and compare reasonably well with what has been reported in the literature where comparisons between fault trees to binary decision diagrams are discussed [143]. Table 3.6
shows a summary of the system reliability values calculated for each of the supply chains
studied and the respective mitigation model prior to any mitigation activities being taken.
For comparison purposes, the respective system reliabilities calculated using the rare event
approximation are also included.

Table 3.6: Comparison of system reliability for perfect and imperfect mitigation models
(no mitigation).

Description
Rare Event Approximation (RREA
)
S
MM
Perfect Mitigation Model (RP
)
S
M
Imperfect Mitigation Model (RIM
)
S

Pressurized
Water
Reactor
0.8785
0.8837
0.8836

Steam
Turbine
Thrust
Bearing
0.6871
0.7275
0.7982

Although the perfect mitigation model provides less information to the practitioner than
the imperfect mitigation model, it can be notionally useful to identify areas of concern
(suppliers to focus on when planning mitigation efforts) within the supply chain. Once
those areas of concern are identiﬁed, the practitioner may chose the speciﬁc mitigation
activities to perform for each individual supplier.
Next, we compare the two mitigation models by analyzing the solution sets at the same
budgetary levels and the system reliabilities at the same budgetary levels for each of the
supply chain systems studied. The perfect mitigation model contains two decision variables, xi and yj , which represent the cut sets containing suppliers and the suppliers chosen
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at each mitigation budget level respectively. As a result, we are able to compare the solution sets of suppliers selected for the perfect and imperfect mitigation models for each
budgetary level. Figure 3.18 includes the results of the solution set comparison for both
supply chains studied. Table 3.7 summarizes the comparison of the frequency by which
suppliers were selected by each mitigation model for each of the supply chains. Overall,
the models vary considerably with respect to the suppliers selected for mitigation. It’s
worth noting that the perfect mitigation model for the pressurized water reactor supply
chain reached 100% reliability at a budgetary level of $100,000. Therefore, comparisons
of the two models at budgetary levels greater than $100,000 are not valid. Across both
supply chains, certain suppliers appear to be preferred by one or both of the mitigation
models. For example, Supplier 3 is selected by both the perfect and imperfect mitigation
models consistently in the pressurized water reactor supply chain up to a budgetary level
of $110,000. Similarly, Supplier 28 is selected by both mitigation models in the steam
turbine thrust bearing supply chain up to a budgetary level of $300,000. In both supply
chains, Supplier 3 and Supplier 28 represent suppliers with lower reliabilities in comparison to other suppliers. From these general trends, it appears that there is a preference
to select suppliers for mitigation that will have the largest contribution to maximizing the
reliability of the respective supply chain portfolio.
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(a) Pressurized water reactor.

(b) Steam turbine thrust bearing.

Figure 3.18: Comparison of solution sets.

94

Table 3.7: Frequency of supplier selection by each mitigation model.

Supplier selected by
Only the perfect mitigation model
Only the imperfect mitigation model
Both the perfect and imperfect mitigation models
Neither the perfect nor imperfect mitigation model
Total number of mitigation opportunities

Pressurized
Water
Reactor
20
0
29
72
121

Steam
Turbine
Thrust
Bearing
132
8
233
947
1320

To compare the system reliabilities for each budgetary level, we introduce a metric,
, that we deﬁne as

|RPS M M

M
RIM
S
P
M
M
RS

|

where RPS M M is the system reliability for the perfect

M
mitigation model and RIM
is the system reliability for the imperfect mitigation model at
S

each budget level for the respective supply chain being analyzed. A summary of results is
presented in Figure 3.19. In general, increases for each supply chain with increasing budget levels with the exception of

ST T B ,

which decreases from 9.6% at a mitigation budget

of $10,000 to 0.8% at $30,000 and then increases at successive budget levels with a few
exceptions. Overall,

PWR

increases with increasing mitigation budgets with a few excep-

tions. Thus, across the range of mitigation budgets inspected, the two mitigation models
diverge from one another with increasing budget and appear to converge to a relatively
constant value of

PWR

⇡ 9.0% and

ST T B

⇡ 16.5% for each of the respective supply

chains. These results are important for the practitioner to understand if both mitigation
models are used and subsequently compared to one another. In addition, the practitioner
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should be aware of how the difference between the two models stabilizes only at higher
budgetary levels.

Figure 3.19: Comparison of perfect and imperfect mitigation model system reliabilities.

In general, the solution times observed for all models, formulations, and supply chains
were as expected in that the linearized formulations (Eq. (3.2)-(3.4) and (3.8)-(3.13)) converged to a solution quicker than the nonlinear formulations (Eq. (3.1)-(3.4) and Eq.
(3.5)-(3.7)) and the pressurized water reactor supply chain containing fewer nodes (i.e.,
suppliers) had solution times that were less than those of the larger steam turbine thrust
bearing supply chain. Overall, the steam turbine generator supply chain, which consists of
44 suppliers took longer to solve than the pressurized water reactor supply chain, which
has 11 suppliers. Additionally, the nonlinear formulation took longer to solve than the
96

linearized formulation. Lastly, overall the perfect mitigation model solved more quickly
than the imperfect mitigation model and the majority of the models contained within the
computational study converged on the optimal solution within a maximum of a few minutes with few exceptions. Table 3.8 shows the solution times as a function of the budgetary
levels at which the respective models were run and provides summary statistics for each
model, formulation, and supply chain combination. When applied to larger supply chain
systems, faster computation time may be beneﬁcial to the supply chain professional. As
a result, depending on the objective of the analysis, the perfect mitigation model may be
most advantageous. However, if the details provided by the imperfect mitigation model
are required, the linearized form of the model would most likely be preferred due to its
improved computational efﬁciency over the nonlinear formulation.
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Table 3.8: Summary of solution times.

$10,000
$20,000
$30,000
$40,000
$50,000
$60,000
$70,000
$80,000
$90,000
$100,000
$110,000
$120,000
$130,000
$140,000
$150,000
$160,000
$170,000
$180,000
$190,000
$200,000
$210,000
$220,000
$230,000
$240,000
$250,000
$260,000
$270,000
$280,000
$290,000
$300,000
Average
Standard Deviation
Maximum
Minimum

Perfect Mitigation Model
Nonlinear
Linear
Bonmin
CPLEX
PWR
STTB
PWR STTB
0.000
0.00
0.000 0.000
0.284
18.80
0.002 0.012
0.158
9.62
0.007 0.010
0.131
9.72
0.008 0.010
0.204
12.05
0.010 0.016
0.240
43.25
0.010 0.009
0.234
55.24
0.006 0.010
0.193
36.91
0.006 0.009
0.045
11.87
0.006 0.010
0.079
13.29
0.003 0.010
0.015
13.62
0.002 0.010
1272.18
0.010
645.30
0.007
246.02
0.007
108.21
0.011
53.29
0.007
5944.49
0.009
273.51
0.009
29.10
0.007
18.47
0.020
10.31
0.007
14.01
0.007
20.60
0.007
51.42
0.007
13.98
0.009
6.92
0.007
7.30
0.008
60.19
0.007
41.02
0.008
35.55
0.007
0.14
302.88
0.01
0.01
0.09 1095.28
0.00
0.00
0.28 5944.49
0.01
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
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Imperfect Mitigation Model
Nonlinear
Linear
Bonmin
CPLEX
PWR
STTB
PWR STTB
0.89
66.59
0.00
0.00
3.03
107.67
0.02
0.97
2.63
114.95
0.05
5.40
1.54
102.97
0.05
7.11
7.13
47.00
0.14
15.14
3.30
309.27
0.09
27.57
2.85
341.24
0.08
35.07
5.61
112.60
0.06
48.31
4.00
291.24
0.11
61.18
2.56
673.47
0.11
69.92
3.48
406.68
0.12
58.99
4.66
229.14
0.11 127.59
0.95
436.55
0.12
91.09
1.15
509.40
0.11
90.47
3.52
191.66
0.15
73.12
7.60
154.08
0.16 111.96
3.45
617.86
0.39 122.44
3.38 2064.43
0.18 156.72
0.63 1216.15
0.18 126.77
3.47
359.67
0.19
94.15
5.88
80.62
0.18 133.09
0.31 3480.11
0.16 187.96
4.29
439.12
0.14 112.24
1.29
147.21
0.14 151.75
0.58
359.57
0.10 312.28
3.97
509.15
0.09 184.43
4.35
210.55
0.13 147.36
0.21
148.24
0.07 173.06
0.32
314.08
0.08 255.75
0.68 1646.63
0.08 164.79
2.92
522.93
0.12 104.89
1.99
711.31
0.07
74.44
7.60 3480.11
0.39 312.28
0.21
47.00
0.00
0.00

3.6

Conclusions and Managerial Insights
The approach outlined in this research solves many of the supply chain risk mitiga-

tion decisions that face a practitioner in a LVHV supply chain. Mitigation decisions are
typically made in silos and in a vacuum without full perspective of the impact that the respective decisions may have on the supply chain or the ﬁrm in general. In practice, multiple
variables play a role in these types of decisions and coalescing the requisite information
together in a timely fashion is a challenge. Further, experience is commonly used over
quantitative analysis and can be inherently biased. Because our approach links the bill of
materials being sourced by modeling the supply chain system as a fault tree, the practitioner is enabled with a quantitative decision tool that takes into account the impact that
an individual mitigation decision can have on the overall reliability of the supply chain
being analyzed. In addition, the data used within the models presented is available to most
managers, which makes the approach practical to implement.
All too often, reactionary decision making is common in supply chain management and
resources are consumed in the associated activities. The methods described in this research
enable the supply chain practitioner to conduct scenario analysis to determine which supply
chain structures pose the greatest risk and highest costs to manage. Examples of scenarios
that can be analyzed include, but are not limited to supplier selection, the use of single
or sole sources of supply, and the impact of redundant sources of supply. In addition, the
supply chain models can be updated to reﬂect the actual performance of suppliers. As
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a result, the supply chain professional may choose to reallocate resources to individual
suppliers in order to further mitigate risk within the supply chain for orders that have not
yet been fulﬁlled.
As noted, many decisions are based on experience, which is valuable, but can be ﬂawed.
The data required in the models described is collected by most ﬁrms and is readily available via their respective enterprise resource planning systems. As a result, practitioners
can utilize available data to make more quantitatively informed decisions, which can be
supplemented by experience. For example, if run at various budgetary levels the imperfect
mitigation model will return a set of supply chain system reliabilities. The practitioner can
then use their experience and knowledge of the respective organization to make a tradeoff
between the mitigation costs and improved reliability provided by the Pareto set.
We compared both the results and run times of the imperfect and perfect mitigation
models presented. As expected, the linearized formulations of both models demonstrated
quicker solution times than their nonlinear counterparts. Further, the steam turbine thrust
bearing supply chain had slower solution times as expected due to it having more suppliers
(44) than the pressurized water reactor supply chain (11).
Even though the model is more complex, the imperfect mitigation model is more practical to implement as it provides provides speciﬁc mitigation activities for the the user to
consider. Despite the fact that only four mitigation options were presented in this research,
additional mitigation options can be added with relative ease to the imperfect mitigation
model and customized to the individual needs of the ﬁrm.
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The research presented herein advanced the use of fault tree analysis to represent a
supply chain based on the bill of materials of a product or service procured [105]. Our
approach provides a portfolio of risk mitigation activities that minimize supply chain risk
while simultaneously achieving the budgetary constraints of the ﬁrm. Furthermore, the
technique is applicable to all levels of the supply chain and viewpoints from within the
supply chain. We demonstrated this by taking the perspective of a ﬁrm constructing a
nuclear power plant as well as a lower-tier ﬁrm within the supply chain that manufactures
a thrust bearing that will be supplied within a critical assembly installed in the power plant.
Several areas of future work are planned. First, our modeling approach only accounts
for the reliability of the suppliers within the supply chain and addresses neither the severity
nor the impact of a delay that may result from a supplier having less than 100% reliability.
Extending the models to account for the impact that a risk may have if realized as well as
the associated downtime is useful.
In addition, our approach assumes that supplier data is known at the time the model is
built. In practice, this is not always the case and is most notable for new suppliers that the
ﬁrm has no prior history with. We plan to develop a multiple logistic regression model to
estimate the reliability of a supplier. In order to do so, it is important to understand the
explanatory variables that correspond to supplier reliability. Once built and implemented
in practice, such a model can leverage machine learning methodologies to better tune the
model as well as provide additional insights into the factors that affect supplier reliability.
By developing predictive models, we will be able to relax the independence assumption
utilized in this research and begin to integrate risks shared by suppliers within a supply
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chain. Examples of such risk factors include natural disasters such as hurricanes, which
are geographically and seasonally dependent.
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CHAPTER 4
PREDICTING SUPPLIER RELIABILITY IN A LOW VOLUME HIGH VALUE
SUPPLY CHAIN
4.1

Introduction
Over the past several years, manufacturing ﬁrms have unbundled, outsourced, off-

shored, globalized, and fragmented [153]. Beneﬁts of these actions include cost reduction,
a better focus on core competencies, access to suppliers with economies of scale and specialized process knowledge, the ability to leverage existing capital investments, increasing
capacity ﬂexibility, and transferring uncertainty [154]. However, new challenges have resulted. One such challenge is the ability to efﬁciently and effectively coordinate multiple
ﬁrms’ activities across the supply chain. This lack of coordination is common and can
result in unplanned disruptions and delays. According to Deloitte [155], 85% of global
supply chains experienced at least one disruption in the past 12 months. However, companies that proactively manage supply chain risk were found to have spent 50% less to
manage supplier disruptions than companies that stated they aren’t proactive.
Proactive supply chain risk management is a complex activity because of silos between organizations, misaligned incentives, inefﬁcient reporting structures, insufﬁcient
processes, and the scarcity of simple tools for professionals to use. Quite simply, although
important, proactive supply chain management is difﬁcult. As a result, it is a rarely applied
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strategy within ﬁrms. According to Juttner et al. [6], what seems to be missing is a more
proactive approach where risk implications are anticipated at an earlier stage. In March
2000, a Philips semiconductor plant caught ﬁre and resulted in a shortage of supply to both
Ericsson and Nokia. The disruption impacted the two companies very differently. Philips
was able to increase production at an alternative supplier and suffered little ﬁnancial impact. Ericsson on the other hand had taken on a single-source strategy and led to a loss of
more than $400 million in potential revenue. [69]
Industry examples like the ﬁre experienced within the Ericsson and Nokia supply
chains points to a need to better understand the potential consequences of taking on a
single-source strategy. The ability to identify and mitigate risks within supply chains is
of the utmost importance to both practitioners and researchers because of the potential for
unfavorable consequences to a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial performance should those risks be realized
[156]. As a result, supply chain risk management is a ﬁeld of increasing importance [45].
The need for proactive supply chain risk management is an important endeavor regardless of the volume being produced by the ﬁrm. However, the challenges faced by low
volume industries and high volume industries can be different. For example, ﬁrms that participate in higher volume industries such as those that support automotive and consumer
markets have several contract manufacturers with relatively equivalent capabilities to procure from. In addition, products are relatively low cost and are made-to-stock. Inventory is
maintained and optimized to provide a buffer against delays and any disruptions that may
occur within a supply chain. Multiple inventory locations may also be possible due to a
wide distribution network as well as the volume moving across the supply chain. Diverse
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inventory locations and transportation networks can subsequently be leveraged to mitigate
localized disruptions in the supply chain should a disaster occur. As a result of the demand
generated in these higher volume industries multiple sources of supply are typical and provide an opportunity for a ﬁrm to diversify purchase order placements and mitigate against
the risks that may result from any one ﬁrm within the supply chain.
Many of these risk mitigation strategies are not afforded to lower volume industries.
Instead, ﬁrms that participate in lower volume industries typically have low (if any) inventory levels and single sources of supply. Companies that support the construction of nuclear
power plants are an example of a low volume industry. Instead of producing millions of
products each year, the demand created when a new nuclear power plant is constructed
may only require a ﬁrm within the supply chain to produce 10 or so items over the course
of 1-2 years. Although the associated production volume of products supporting the industry are typically low, the selling price for critical items may be quite high (on the order
of hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars per unit). The higher value of the products
being sourced in combination with fewer suppliers and lower quantities adds to the risk
within the supply chain and necessitates a higher degree of reliability.
Aside from the severity of adverse events that may result from nuclear energy should
a nuclear event occur, several factors exist that make nuclear energy a cost prohibitive solution. In addition to low volumes and somewhat sporadic demand, the strict requirements
and high standards required to enter the nuclear supply chain cause many suppliers to avoid
the industry altogether. In turn, companies responsible for constructing and maintaining
nuclear power plants are faced with a limited supply base to produce critical, large, and ex105

pensive items. The quality and reliability of these items are essential to the safe operation
of the nuclear power plant. In addition, ﬁrms are faced with the ﬁnancial consequences
of delays in the delivery of these products to the construction site. Losses incurred by the
power plant owner as a result of delays are estimated at $1.2 million per day [149] and can
lead to liquidated damages being levied on suppliers. Although nuclear power capacity is
increasing steadily with about 50 reactors under construction globally most of the power
reactors currently planned or under construction are in Asia. As a result of a real or perceived imbalance between the costs and risks associated with nuclear power, new power
plant construction has slowed in the United States. The last nuclear power plant to be
commissioned in the United States was the Watts Bar plant, which was constructed from
1973-1990 and became operational in 1996. (www.world-nuclear.org)
In March 2013, construction began on a total of four new nuclear reactors in the United
States with two being constructed at the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Generating Station site
near Jenkinsville, SC and two at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant site in Burke County,
GA. Since construction began, both locations have experienced signiﬁcant delays. In 2014,
the industry identiﬁed two primary challenges for nuclear power to remain competitive: (1)
ensure that the economics of nuclear power are competitive with other generating sources
and (2) maintain a reliable international supply chain that is capable of delivering high
quality products [3]. In the summer of 2017 construction at the Virgil C. Summer site
was abandoned due to a number of factors, including the deterioration of a “robust supply
chain” within the industry over the past 30 years [150].
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The ability to identify and mitigate risks within supply chains, whether supporting high
or low volume industries, is of the utmost importance to both practitioners and researchers
because of the potential for unfavorable consequences to a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial performance
should those risks be realized [156]. As a result, supply chain risk management is a ﬁeld of
increasing importance [45]. Although much has been published in the domain, few studies
have quantitatively identiﬁed the speciﬁc factors that affect supply chain risk. Some authors have broadly categorized the types of supply chain risks in terms of whether or not
the risk occurs internally or externally to the ﬁrm or supply chain [8, 157, 158, 159] as
well as whether or not the risk is controllable or not controllable [157]. Ho et al. [9] categorizes risk factors as being macro or micro in nature. Examples of macro factors include
natural disaster, war, terrorism, and political environment [112, 39, 157]. Micro factors
include risks associated with demand, manufacturing, supply, information, transportation,
and ﬁnance.
In practice, ﬁrms that actively manage supply chain risk utilize a variety of tools to
estimate the probability of a disruption and the factors that affect risk. Most are based
on historical performance, are isolated to individual measures, and few are quantitative.
Examples of methods include qualitative rating systems (high, medium, low), weighted
averages or compilations of supplier metrics (on-time delivery, ﬁrst-time quality, etc.), and
hazard matrices. Although these types of methods can be directionally effective, little research rigorously validates their performance in actually improving risk management decisions [2]. In addition, the application of these methods have poor resolution, do not always
provide clear direction, are inconsistent over the course of time, and can be fraught with
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the biases of the individuals performing the rating or applying weights to the quantitative
measures. Subsequently, poor decision making can result when based on these techniques.
Deploying more sophisticated quantitative modeling techniques that utilize machine
learning algorithms can be more difﬁcult to implement in practice. However, these techniques can provide a signiﬁcantly more objective view of a ﬁrm’s supply chain risk than
the qualitative rating systems frequently employed. In this research, we overcome this barrier by demonstrating a methodology that applies available techniques to a LVHV ﬁrm’s
supply chain data set.
With respect to risk identiﬁcation in supply chains, most research focuses on higher
volume industries such as automotive and consumer packaged goods and not on LVHV
industries like nuclear power plant construction [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. Furthermore, few
if any comprehensive quantitative studies based on empirical data have been conducted
to determine the factors that affect supply chain reliability. In this research we address
this gap by proposing a multinomial logistic regression machine learning model based on
actual industry data with the purpose of predicting the reliability of sourcing a product
within the nuclear power plant construction industry.
We use The American Production and Inventory Control Society’s (APICS) Supply
Chain Operations Reference (SCOR® ) Model as a basis for our deﬁnition of reliability and
as the dependent variables in the proposed models. The SCOR® Model was developed by
practitioners and is an industry-respected guide to improve the performance of supply chain
processes within organizations [160]. The SCOR® Model proposes a set of performance
attributes, which are a grouping of metrics. The performance attributes are (1) reliability,
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(2) responsiveness, (3) agility, (4) cost, and (5) asset management efﬁciency. Reliability is
deﬁned as “perfect order fulﬁllment” and consists of four metrics. These metrics include
(1) the percentage of orders delivered in full, (2) delivery performance to customer commit
date, (3) documentation accuracy, and (4) perfect condition. As a result of the data available, the proposed model aims to predict reliability in terms of three of the four metrics:
(1) delivery performance to customer commit date (on-time), (2) documentation accuracy
(perfect documentation), and (3) perfect condition (perfect quality). Logistic regression is
an appropriate method given that we are predicting the probability of success of a system
based on a number of factors. The resulting model has practical implications for supply
chain professionals in that it can be used to compare the reliability of suppliers during the
supplier selection process or as input to predicting the reliability of a given supply chain
system [161].
We categorize the explanatory variables in the model as being supplier-speciﬁc, purchasespeciﬁc, or item-speciﬁc. Supplier-speciﬁc variables include attributes inherent to an individual supplier such as core competency, quality program sophistication, and size of the
ﬁrm. Regional factors that affect a supplier’s reliability may be shared by multiple suppliers
simultaneously and include the susceptibility to natural disasters, government unrest, and
transportation challenges. Because this information wasn’t readily available in the data
sets used for this research, we have chosen to use supplier location data (country, state,
postal code) as a proxy. Purchase-speciﬁc variables include such factors as the quality
requirements imposed on the supplier, whether or not the purchase was made generically
or for a speciﬁc product that the ﬁrm manufactures, the timing of the purchase, expected
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lead time, and the value of the order. The third type of explanatory variables investigated
are those that are speciﬁc to the item or service being procured. Examples of this type of
variable include the type of item (casting, forging, etc.) being procured, the level of quality
required, and the value of the item to name a few.
This research makes key contributions to the current literature on supply chain risk
management in that we propose an implementable method to quantify procurement risks.
Speciﬁcally, we develop a multiple logistic regression model to predict the reliability of a
procurement in a LVHV supply chain. We conﬁrm our model using 10-fold cross validation
and assess the results using a set of performance metrics. Lastly, we test the signiﬁcance
of explanatory variables within the model and draw conclusions about the underlying data
set based on the observed results. The proposed method improves upon existing qualitative
methods and provides a framework for practitioners to improve proactive decision making
by predicting the reliability of a procurement.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the data
and variables used to build the model. The methodology used is found in Section 4.3. In
Section 4.4, we analyze the numerical results of the model and draw conclusions in Section
4.5.
4.2

Data Description
The data used in this model is actual data collected within a ﬁrm’s enterprise resource

planning (ERP) system. The data set includes a total of 3,784 shipments on 2,928 purchase
order (PO) line items received from 157 suppliers across one full calendar year and is rep110

resentative of a typical year for the ﬁrm. In total, 42 explanatory variables are included
in building the models within the scope of this research. Explanatory variables were selected based on practitioner knowledge as well as availability within the ERP system. Each
of the explanatory variables are organized into one of three groups: (1) supplier-speciﬁc
(supplier), (2) purchase-speciﬁc (purchase), and (3) item-speciﬁc (item). Supplier-speciﬁc
variables are representative of factors speciﬁc to the ﬁrm providing the good or service. Examples include the quality program qualiﬁcations that the ﬁrm holds, the ﬁrm’s geographic
location (state, country), and the volume of sales the ﬁrm has received from the supplier.
Factors associated with the speciﬁc purchase order represent purchase-speciﬁc variables
and include the quality requirements imposed on the purchase order, the quantity of items
or services included on the purchase order, and the expected lead time for the purchase
order. Item-speciﬁc variables include those elements that are associated with the item or
service being purchased. Examples include the product family to which the item or service
belongs, the program that the item or service is being purchased for, and the activities that
the ﬁrm will be requested to perform in order to provide the item or service. Seventeen
variables comprise the supplier grouping, 18 are included in the purchase group, and seven
variables are incorporated in the item group. A description of each variable within its respective group is included in Tables 4.1- 4.3 along with the variable’s type and the number
of levels (if a binary or categorical variable) that comprise each.
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Table 4.1: Description of explanatory variables related to the supplier.
i

Deﬁnition

1

Supplier: The supplier providing the ﬁrm the good or service.

2

PO Line Items: The number of line items received from a respective supplier within the current year and prior three

Type

Levels

Categorical

158

Discrete

-

years.
3

POs: The number of purchase orders received from a respective supplier within the current year and prior three years.

Discrete

-

4

Rework POs: The number of purchase orders received with rework completed by the respective supplier within the

Discrete

-

Discrete

-

Discrete

-

Discrete

-

Discrete

-

Discrete

-

Discrete

-

Discrete

-

Discrete

-

Discrete

-

Categorical

36

current year and prior three years.
5

Level 1 Qualiﬁcations: The total number of the most rigorous quality program qualiﬁcations that the respective supplier
has been qualiﬁed to by the purchaser (example: ASME code, etc.).

6

Level 2 Qualiﬁcations: The total number of the second most rigorous quality program qualiﬁcations that the respective
supplier has been qualiﬁed to by the purchaser (example: 10CFR50 App B, 10CFR21, welding, non-destructive
examination, etc.).

7

Level 3 Qualiﬁcations: The total number of the third most rigorous quality program qualiﬁcations that the respective
supplier has been qualiﬁed to by the purchaser (example: ISO 9001, MIL-STD, etc.).

8

Level 4 Qualiﬁcations: The total number of the second least rigorous quality program qualiﬁcations that the respective

9

Level 5 Qualiﬁcations: The total number of the least rigorous quality program qualiﬁcations that the respective supplier

supplier has been qualiﬁed to by the purchaser (example: qualiﬁed questionnaire, data assessment, etc.).

has been qualiﬁed to by the purchaser (example: no quality program required).
10

Highest Qualiﬁcation: The most rigorous quality program qualiﬁcation to which the respective supplier has been
qualiﬁed by the purchaser (Level 1=Most, Level 5=Least).

11

Lowest Qualiﬁcation: The least rigorous quality program qualiﬁcation to which the respective supplier has been
qualiﬁed by the purchaser (Level 1=Most, Level 5=Least).

12

Qualiﬁcation Range: The difference between the most rigorous and least rigorous quality program qualiﬁcation to
which the respective supplier has been qualiﬁed by the purchaser (Level 1=Most, Level 5=Least).

13

Qualiﬁcations: The total number of quality program qualiﬁcations to which the respective supplier has been qualiﬁed
by the purchaser.

14

Core Competency: The deﬁning capability with regard to a product or service that the respective supplier provides the
purchaser.

15

Country: The country where the respective supplier is located.

Categorical

9

16

State: The state, if within the United States, where the respective supplier is located.

Categorical

29

Sales: The total value of all purchase orders provide by the respective supplier to the purchaser within the current year

Continuous

-

17

and prior three years combined.
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Table 4.2: Description of explanatory variables related to the purchase order.
i

Description

18

Expected Lead Time: The number of days between the date that the contract was placed and the expected contractual

Type

Levels

Discrete

-

date of receipt.
19

Expected Receipt Date: The expected date of receipt.

Discrete

-

20

Date PO Line Created: The date that the purchase order line item was initiated to the respective supplier.

Discrete

-

21

PO Line Quantity: The quantity of products/services on the respective purchase order line item that the respective

Discrete

-

Discrete

-

supplier is expected to deliver.
22

Multiple Receipts per Line: Designation of whether multiple shipments were received by the purchaser associated with
each purchase order line item placed to the respective supplier.

23

Rework: Designation of whether or not the purchase order line item required rework activities at the respective supplier.

24

Quarter and Year of Receipt: The quarter and year that the shipment was received by the purchaser from the

Binary

2

Discrete

-

Discrete

-

Discrete

-

Discrete

-

Discrete

-

Discrete

-

Discrete

-

Discrete

-

respective supplier.
25

Month and Year of Receipt: The month and year that the shipment was received by the purchaser from the respective
supplier.

26

Level 1 Qualiﬁcation Requirements: The total number of the most rigorous quality program requirements contained
within the purchase order (example: ASME code, etc.). These purchase order requirements correspond to the
qualiﬁcations of the respective supplier (Level 1 Qualiﬁcations).

27

Level 2 Qualiﬁcation Requirements: The total number of the second most rigorous quality program requirements
contained within the purchase order (example: 10CFR50 App B, 10CFR21, welding, non-destructive examination, etc.).
These purchase order requirements correspond to the qualiﬁcations of the respective supplier (Level 2 Qualiﬁcations).

28

Level 3 Qualiﬁcation Requirements: The total number of the third most rigorous quality program requirements
contained within the purchase order (example: ISO 9001, MIL-STD, etc.). These purchase order requirements
correspond to the qualiﬁcations of the respective supplier (Level 3 Qualiﬁcations).

29

Level 4 Qualiﬁcation Requirements: The total number of the least rigorous quality program requirements contained
within the purchase order (example: qualiﬁed questionnaire, data assessment, etc. ). These purchase order requirements
correspond to the qualiﬁcations of the respective supplier (Level 4 Qualiﬁcations).

30

Highest Qualiﬁcation Requirement: The most rigorous quality program requirement contained within the purchase
order (Level 1=High, Level 5=Low).

31

Lowest Qualiﬁcation Requirement: The least rigorous quality program requirement contained within the purchase
order (Level 1=High, Level 5=Low).

32

Qualiﬁcation Requirements: The total number of quality program requirements contained within the purchase order.

Discrete

-

33

Quality Requirements: The total number of quality requirements (in addition to quality program requirements)

Discrete

-

Binary

2

Discrete

-

contained within the purchase order (example: dimensional, inspection, documentation, etc.).
34

Program Family or Generic: The designation of whether or not the purchaser has assigned the item or service being
purchased to a product line for consumption after receipt.

35

Value: The total amount paid by the purchaser for the respective item or service associated with an individual purchase
order and line item.
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Table 4.3: Description of explanatory variables related to the item being purchased.
i

Deﬁnition

Type

Levels

36

Commodity: The primary coding system used by the ﬁrm to group the item/service being procured.

Categorical

40

37

Item/Service Identiﬁer: A coding system used by the ﬁrm to identify complexity of the item or service being procured

Categorical

10

(example: assembly, raw material, etc.).
38

Item Family: A secondary coding system used by the ﬁrm to group the item/service being procured.

Categorical

40

39

Service Family: Similar to the commodity coding system, an identiﬁer that groups the item being procured into families

Categorical

24

Categorical

54

Categorical

9

Discrete

-

of procurements.
40

Program: The designation that the purchaser has assigned the item or service being purchased that describes the
speciﬁc product line that will use the procurement.

41

Program Family: The designation that the purchaser has assigned the item or service being purchased that describes the
family of product lines that will use the procurement.

42

Activities: The total number of activities that the supplier will be asked to perform regarding the item or service being
procured on an individual purchase order.

We incorporate all 42 explanatory variables into seven full training models. Each of
the seven models utilizes a dependent variable that represents one or more than one of
the combinations of the three measures that comprise reliability as deﬁned by the SCOR®
model. The dependent variables are binary variables and represent whether or not an item
or service associated with a purchase order line item was delivered (1) on-time to the
respective contractual delivery date, (2) with perfect documentation accuracy the ﬁrst time,
and/or (3) with perfect quality the ﬁrst time. Table 4.4 summarizes the seven combinations
of the dependent variables that represent reliability as well as the aggregated favorable
(reliable) and unfavorable (unreliable) responses of each across the data set used. Figure
4.1 summarizes the distribution of supplier performance for the seven reliability metrics.
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Table 4.4: Summary of reliability metrics.
Model (r)

Reliability Metric / Dependent Variable

Reliable

Unreliable

n

1

On-Time

91.70%

8.30%

3,784

2

Perfect Documentation

65.38%

34.62%

3,784

3

Perfect Quality

89.30%

10.70%

3,784

4

On-Time + Perfect Documentation

62.00%

38.00%

3,784

5

On-Time + Perfect Quality

82.21%

17.79%

3,784

6

On-Time + Perfect Quality + Perfect Documentation

56.71%

43.29%

3,784

7

Perfect Quality + Perfect Documentation

59.62%

40.38%

3,784
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Figure 4.1: Supplier reliability distributions.
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4.3

Methodology
To prepare the master data set, we joined a number of data tables within the ﬁrm’s ERP

system to arrive at the set of dependent and independent variables to test for signiﬁcance
within the model. Initially, data sets representing multiple years of transactions were analyzed. However, after reviewing the data available, we determined that one year of data was
sufﬁcient to test and build the intended models with consideration for a reasonable amount
of computing time. Next, we performed a summary analysis on the data set across the
dependent variables to better understand the patterns in the underlying data. In each of the
dependent variables, the two classes (reliable and unreliable) were found to be imbalanced
and not represented equally. Imbalanced data sets can cause problems for data mining
and statistical learning since traditional machine learning algorithms have a tendency to
classify data points in the class that occurs most frequently [162]. Several methods have
been proposed to deal with imbalanced data sets and include random over-sampling, random under-sampling, Tomek links, condensed nearest neighbor rule, one-sided selection,
neighborhood cleaning rule, synthetic minority over-sampling technique (SMOTE), and
hybrids of these approaches [163]. Other authors have reported that one holdout sampling
method, k-fold cross-validation, is the best method to use for model selection when applied
to real world data sets and when imbalanced data sets are involved [164]. More speciﬁcally, 10 seems to be an optimal number of folds when trying to optimize the time it takes
to complete a test while at the same time minimizing the bias and variance associated with
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the validation process [165]. As a result, we chose to employ 10-fold cross validation to
validate the predictor variables within our model and as the standard way to predict the
error rate of our model.
In 10-fold cross validation, the data set is divided into 10 parts in which the class is
represented in approximately the same proportions as in the full dataset. Next, the model,
in our case a logistic regression model, is ﬁt on the training set (nine-tenths of the data) and
then tested on the test set (one-tenth of the data set). Each of the 10 parts is then held out in
turn and the model trained on the remaining nine-tenths. The error rate is then calculated
on the test set. The experiment is repeated 10 times. As a result, the model is built a total
of 10 times on different training sets and tested using 10 test sets. Finally, the 10 error
estimates are averaged to yield an overall error estimate. [166]
For the purposes of our research, we utilize multiple logistic regression to estimate
the reliability of a supplier within a LVHV supply chain. Logistic regression is a type of
regression method belonging to a family of generalized linear models that evaluate the effects, include relevant interactions, and estimate response probabilities. The response and
explanatory variables within the model can be categorical, discrete, binary, or continuous.
Logistic regression is appropriate when the response variable describes the probability of
an event. The method is used in a wide range of applications such as credit-scoring and
genetics. In multiple logistic regression the response variable is based on more than one
explanatory variable. Here we apply multiple logistic regression to predict the probability of success of purchases made in a LVHV supply chain, which takes the general form
outlined in Equation (4.1) below. [167]
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logit [⇡r (x)] = ↵ +

1 x1

+

2 x2

+ ... +

(4.1)

i xi

Where: ⇡r (x) = P (Y = 1) at values x = (x1 , ..., xp ) of p predictors
Y is a binary response variable

(4.2)

xi is an explanatory variable

(4.3)

↵ is the intercept parameter

(4.4)

i

is the effect of xi on the log odds that Y = 1

r is the index for the reliability model; r = 1, ..., 7
i is the index for dependent variables; i = 1, ..., 42

A variety of performance measures are used to evaluate the learning method being employed. Classiﬁers are typically evaluated by a confusion matrix, which groups the number
of correctly classiﬁed positive and negative examples (true positive and true negative) and
the number of incorrectly classiﬁed positive and negative examples (false positive and false
negative) [166]. The general form of a confusion matrix is shown in Table 4.5.

Table 4.5: General form of confusion matrix for different outcomes of a two-class prediction.
Predicted Class

Actual Class

Unreliable

Reliable

Unreliabile

True Positive (TP)

False Negative (FN)

Reliable

False Positive (FP)

True Negative (TN)

119

In this analysis, true positive represents the minority class (failure/unreliable) and true
negative represents the majority class (success/reliable), which is a result of how the machine learning algorithm used to build the logistic regression models deﬁnes probability
of success. More speciﬁcally, unreliability is deﬁned as success. Predictive accuracy is
a metric that can be derived from the confusion matrix and is deﬁned in Equation (4.5).
[168]

Accuracy =

TP + TN
TP + FP + TN + FN

(4.5)

Where: T P = True Positive
T N = True Negative
F P = False Positive
F N = False Negative

When the data set is imbalanced a confusion matrix may not be sufﬁcient to determine
classiﬁer performance and more robust performance measures must be used. Examples
include the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, the Area Under the ROC Curve
(AUC), precision, recall, and the F-value. The ROC curve represents the best decision
boundaries for relative costs of true positive and true negative. The AUC is sometimes
used because, in general, the larger the area the better the model. Additionally, the AUC
can be interpreted as the probability that the classiﬁer ranks a randomly chosen positive
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instance above a randomly chosen negative one. Precision and recall are derived from the
confusion matrix (see Equations (4.6) and (4.7)).

P recision =

TP
TP + FP

(4.6)

Recall =

TP
TP + FN

(4.7)

In general, the goal for imbalanced data sets is to improve the recall without reducing
the precision. However, the two measures can be in conﬂict since when increasing the
true positive for the minority class, the number of false positives can also be increased.
In this case, the precision will reduce. The F-value (see Equation (4.8)) is another metric
that is sometimes used to determine performance of a classiﬁer. The F-value represents the
tradeoffs between precision and recall and presents a single value that reﬂects the goodness
of a classiﬁer in the presence of rare classes. The parameter

corresponds to the relative

importance of precision vs. recall and is typically set to 1. [168, 166]

F

value =

(1 +
2

2

) ⇥ Recall ⇥ P recision
⇥ Recall ⇥ P recision
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(4.8)

In addition to determining the accuracy by which the model is predicting the classes,
we are also interested in better understanding the effect of each of the independent variables within the model. We use the odds ratio for each independent variable as a basis.
If we deﬁne ⇡ as the probability of success, it follows that the probability of failure is
(1

⇡). Success and failure are relative and depend upon how the dependent variable

class is deﬁned in the logistic regression model. In he case of this study, success is deﬁned
as unreliability and failure is deﬁned as reliability. Odds is then deﬁned as ⌦ =

⇡
(1 ⇡)

or

the probability that success (unreliable event) occurs divided by the probability that failure
(reliable outcome) occurs. It follows that the odds ratio (✓) is a measure of the odds of one
treatment (⌦1 ) in relation to another (⌦2 ), ✓ =

⌦1
.
⌦2

For example, in our model, one of the

independent variables is the supplier of the good or service. The odds of a particular supplier, Supplier A, can be described as the probability of Supplier A not delivering on-time
over the probability of Supplier A delivering on time (⌦A =
of all other suppliers excluding Supplier A (⌦¬A =

⇡¬A
)
(1 ⇡¬A )

⇡A
).
(1 ⇡A )

Likewise, the odds

can be calculated. The odds

ratio for any supplier is then the quotient of the odds of that particular supplier and the odds
of all other suppliers (✓A =

⌦A
).
⌦¬A

In logistic regression, the exponential function of the

regression coefﬁcient is the odds ratio (e i = ✓i ) associated with the respective explanatory
variable (xi ). [167, 169]
In order to determine the signiﬁcance of the independent variables in the model, we
calculate a p-value from the odds ratio based on an approach proposed by Altman et al. [? ],
which uses the formulae listed in Equations (4.9)-(4.12) below. By taking this approach, we
test the null hypothesis (Ho :

i

= 0) to determine if the coefﬁcient ( i ) of each dependent
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variable (xi ) has a signiﬁcant effect. The upper (u) and lower (l) cutoff limits for the 95%
conﬁdence interval were selected as u = 1.2 and l = 0.8 respectively.

(4.9)

Estimate = log(✓)
log(u) log(l)
2 ⇥ 1.96
Estimate
z=
Standard Error
⇥
value = exp ( 0.717 ⇥ z)

(4.10)

Standard Error =

p

(4.11)
0.416 ⇥ z 2

⇤

(4.12)

4.4 Numerical Results
For modeling and evaluation, we employed the use of the Waikato Environment for
Knowledge Analysis (Weka) suite of machine learning software (version 3.8.2) developed
by the Machine Learning Group at the University of Waikato. Weka is an open source
collection of machine learning algorithms for data mining tasks and contains tools for data
pre-processing, classiﬁcation, regression, clustering, association rules, and visualization.
[170]
In all, seven multinomial logistic regression models were built using the 42 explanatory
variables described in Tables 4.1-4.3 and tested using 10-fold cross validation. Each model
was subsequently evaluated using a set of standard performance metrics (Equations (4.5)(4.8)) and explanatory variables were evaluated for signiﬁcance within the model.
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4.4.1

Multiple Logistic Regression Models

Tables B.1-B.7 in the Appendix summarize the results of the full multiple logistic regression training models. The coefﬁcient ( i ), odds ratio (OR), and p-value are listed for
each of the explanatory variables (i = 1, ..., 42) and levels in each of the reliability models
(r = 1, ..., 7). An index, m (m = 0, ..., 442), is introduced to represent the levels of each
explanatory variable.
Weka reports a weighted average of all of the key metrics. Table 4.6 shows a summary
of those results of the performance metrics for each of the seven training models after validation. All models were found to be reasonably accurate in predicting the respective unreliability metric with accuracies ranging from 0.7384 for On-Time+Perfect Quality+Perfect
Documentation (r = 6) to 0.9212 for the On-Time model (r = 1). Using AUC as an overall
performance metric, the Perfect Documentation (r = 2) and On-Time+Perfect Documentation (r = 4) models demonstrated the largest areas under the ROC curve with values of
0.8140 and 0.8100 respectively. Perfect Quality (r = 3) had the lowest AUC of the seven
models, 0.7270.

Table 4.6: Summary of classiﬁcation results.
Model (r)

Unreliability Metric / Dependent Variable

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

AUC

F-value

1

On-Time

0.9212

0.9080

0.9210

0.8010

0.9120

2

Perfect Documentation

0.7756

0.7710

0.7760

0.8140

0.7710

3

Perfect Quality

0.8972

0.8770

0.8970

0.7270

0.8820

4

On-Time + Perfect Documentation

0.7666

0.7630

0.7670

0.8100

0.7630

5

On-Time + Perfect Quality

0.8322

0.8080

0.8320

0.7520

0.8120

6

On-Time + Perfect Quality + Perfect Documentation

0.7384

0.7370

0.7380

0.7980

0.7360

7

Perfect Quality + Perfect Documentation

0.7423

0.7400

0.7420

0.7950

0.7380
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4.4.2

Signiﬁcance of Explanatory Variables

As noted in the previous section, the 42 explanatory variables were able to predict reasonably well the unreliability metrics chosen in this study. In this section, we explore the
signiﬁcance of the explanatory variables in making those predictions in more detail. As
a ﬁrst-level analysis, we analyzed the most positive and most negative values of

i

for

each explanatory variable (i) across all seven models. In general, coefﬁcients for those
variables associated with speciﬁc suppliers (i = 1, ..., 17) had the most positive and negative correlation coefﬁcients across all levels, which indicates that suppliers who have been
unreliable (or reliable) in the past are also likely to replicate their respective performance
in the future. For example, one supplier (x1,5 ) demonstrated a parameter value (

1,5 )

of

25.28, which corresponds to an odds ratio (✓1,5 ) of 9.25 ⇥ 1010 for model r = 1 and indicates that this supplier has a 9.25 ⇥ 1010 greater odds of not delivering the products they
supply on-time when compared to other suppliers.
Five variables, had coefﬁcients equivalent to zero (
i,m

i,m

⇡ 0) across all seven models.

= 0 indicates that any value of the variable associated with the coefﬁcient results in

an equal probability of outcome. Those variables included the sales volume procured from
the speciﬁc supplier (x17,244 ), the expected lead time of procurement (x18,245 ), the date the
purchase order was created (x20,247 ), the quantity of items on the purchase order (x21,248 ),
and the value of the purchase order (x35,264 ). Speciﬁc to the models developed in this
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research, the aforementioned variables do not appear to have an effect on the reliability of
the procurement.
In addition to analyzing the groupings of each explanatory variable (represented by i),
each level within categorical explanatory variables (represented by m) was also analyzed.
Figure 4.2 includes the ﬁve highest positive coefﬁcients (+
coefﬁcients (

im )

within each model. As noted above, e

ratio for variable i level m. As
✓im ! 0. In practice, as

im

im

im )
im

and the ﬁve lowest negative

= ✓im where ✓im is the odds

! +1 , ✓im ! +1. Likewise, as

im

!

1,

! +1 and ✓im ! +1, the associated variable increases the

probability of a successful (unreliable) outcome with respect to an unsuccessful (reliable)
outcome when that particular variable increases or in the case of a categorical variable,
the particular level of the variable is present. In contrast, as

im

!

1 and ✓im ! 0,

the associated variable decreases the probability of a successful (unreliable) outcome with
respect to an unsuccessful (reliable) outcome when the variable increases or the level of
the variable is present. For example, in the model that estimates the probability of not
delivering the particular product or service on-time (r = 1), the explanatory variable State
(x16 ) has 29 different levels. In other words the ﬁrm received product from 29 different
states within the United States of America. For one of the states (m = 218)

16,218

=

+1.64, which corresponds to ✓16,218 = 5.16 ⇥ 1000 . This is analogous to saying that the
odds of not delivering a product on-time from State 218 (x16,218 ) is 5.16⇥1000 times greater
than not delivering a product on-time when sourced from any of the other 28 states in the
data set.
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Figure 4.2: Top ﬁve and bottom ﬁve coefﬁcient (

127

im )

values for each model.

Variables with ✓im !

1 and ✓im ! +1 can both have signiﬁcance within the

model. We applied Equation (4.12) to derive a p-value (pim ) and assessed each variable’s
(and level’s) signiﬁcance at a 95% conﬁdence level (↵ = 0.05) within each model. The
reader is referred to Tables B.1-B.7 in the Appendix for p-values associated with all variables within all of the full models. Of the 442 variable (i) and level (m) combinations in
each model, the prediction model for On-Time Delivery (r = 1) had the highest proportion
(0.9163) of signiﬁcant variables and levels. The model predicting the combination of ontime delivery, perfect quality, and perfect documentation (r = 6) had the lowest proportion
(0.8194) of signiﬁcant variables and levels. Figure 4.3 summarizes the overall performance
of the seven models with respect to AUC and accuracy as a function of the proportion of
variables and levels. Overall, the On-Time (r = 1) prediction model seems to demonstrate
the best combination of proportion of signiﬁcant variables and levels and performance.

Figure 4.3: Proportion of variables and levels found to be signiﬁcant as a function of AUC
and accuracy.
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Of all the variables and levels tested for signiﬁcance, 70.6% were found to have p
values < 0.05 in all seven of the models. Thus, in those instances we fail to reject
the null hypothesis (Ho :

i

= 0). This proportion of signiﬁcant variables and levels is

heavily weighted by the number of suppliers in the study. Conversely, only 10 (2.3%)
of the variables were not found to be signiﬁcant across any of the seven models - PO
Line Items (x2,158 ), POs (x3,159 ), Rework POs (x4,160 ), Sales (x17,244 ), Expected Lead Time
(x18,245 ), Expected Receipt Date (x19,246 ), Date PO Line Created (x20,247 ), PO Line Quantity (x21,248 ), Quality Requirements (x33,262 ), and Value (x35,264 ). Three variables - Level 2
Qualiﬁcations (x6,162 ), Qualiﬁcations (x13,169 ), and Qualiﬁcation Requirements (x32,261 ) were only found to be signiﬁcant (p

value < 0.05) in the On-Time (r = 1) model. Other

variables were found to be signiﬁcant in some models, but not all models. Variables with
several levels were found to have some levels that were signiﬁcant while other levels were
not. Figures 4.4 - 4.7 summarize the signiﬁcant variables (p
the seven models, which are noted using the symbol
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.

values < 0.05) in each of

Figure 4.4: Summary of signiﬁcant variables (1 of 4).
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Figure 4.5: Summary of signiﬁcant variables (2 of 4).
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Figure 4.6: Summary of signiﬁcant variables (3 of 4).
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Figure 4.7: Summary of signiﬁcant variables (4 of 4).
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Of particular interest in this study are the results that indicate which variables do not
have a signiﬁcant impact on the reliability of a procurement regardless of the reliability
metric used as the dependent variable. The 10 variables (noted above) fall into two of the
three explanatory variable groups - related to the supplier and related to the purchase order.
More speciﬁcally, the volume of work awarded to the supplier (x2,158 , x3,159 , x17,244 ) or the
amount of rework (x4,160 ) completed by the supplier on the purchase order over a four
year time span was not found to be a signiﬁcant factor in a supplier’s reliability. This is
somewhat contradictory to common logic, which would suggest that the more a ﬁrm works
with a supplier, the more reliable they become.
Of the six variables related to the purchase order that were not found to be signiﬁcant
contributors to reliability, three (x18,245 , x19,246 , x20,247 ) correspond to the timing of the
procurement and more speciﬁcally, the expected lead time for the procurement, the time
of year the procurement is expected, and when the purchase order was created. Although
interesting, additional investigation is required if these results indicate that seasonality with
respect to these variables does not exist.
The volume on the purchase order both in terms of quantity (x21,248 ) and value (x35,264 )
were not found to be signiﬁcant contributors in any of the reliability models. Like the
historical volume awarded to the supplier, the volume placed on a speciﬁc purchase order
does not appear to contribute to the reliability of a procurement. Lastly, the number of
qualiﬁcation requirements (x32,261 ) indicated on the purchase order was also found not be
signiﬁcant, which suggests that neither more or less requirements improve or reduce the
reliability of a procurement.
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4.5

Conclusions
In this chapter, we developed seven reliability prediction models using a combination of

multinomial logistic regression and 10-fold cross validation based on actual data collected
within a LVHV supply chain. The dependent variables within each model were based on
the APICS SCOR® Model deﬁnition for reliability. In the logistic regression model, success was deﬁned as unreliability. More speciﬁcally, the seven models were constructed to
predict the probability that a purchase is not delivered On-Time, without Perfect Documentation, without Perfect Quality, and combinations thereof. The models were based on a
total of 42 independent variables. Each variable and level within each model was tested for
statistical signiﬁcance (95% conﬁdence level).
Supplier related variables describing the volume of work awarded to the supplier (purchase order line items, purchase orders, reworked purchase orders, and total sales) throughout the year were not found to be signiﬁcant contributors to reliability. Similarly, variables
associated with the purchase order itself such as the expected lead time, the time of year
that the receipt was expected, when the purchase order was created, the number of items
on the purchase order line, the total number of quality requirements, or overall value of the
purchase order were found to not have any signiﬁcance with respect to reliability. Further,
in the majority of cases the supplier chosen for the procurement, the core competency of
the supplier, and the supplier’s location were found to be signiﬁcant contributors. All variables associated with the item itself demonstrated signiﬁcance in at least two of the seven
models.
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In addition to statistical signiﬁcance of individual explanatory variables and categories
within explanatory variables, metrics for each model were analyzed to assess the ability
for the explanatory variables to predict reliability. All classiﬁcation metrics for all models
indicated a relatively high level of accuracy (0.7384-0.9212), precision (0.7370-0.9080),
recall (0.7380-0.9210), AUC (0.7270-0.8140), and F-measure (0.7360-0.9120).
The application of the models described within this chapter has practical signiﬁcance
in predicting the reliability/unreliability of a purchase within a LVHV supply chain. The
data used to build the models described herein is readily available in most ﬁrms that have
ERP systems. For those ﬁrms that do not employ systems to readily collect the data described, implementing sufﬁcient data collection streams would not be difﬁcult. Supply
chain professionals can use the resulting models to assess and compare suppliers, items
to be purchased, or purchase order characteristics across one or more than one of seven
measures of reliability. In addition, where sole or single sources of supply are required,
the ﬁrm making the purchase will have a better understanding of the reliability and can
decide to take appropriate measures to mitigate the associated risks. The features of this
approach are an improvement over methods currently employed in the industry. The models presented within this chapter are speciﬁc to the data sets upon which they were built.
However, the methods to build such models as those described have the potential of being
transferrable to other ﬁrms’ data when combined with speciﬁc knowledge of the business.
Several areas of future work are recommended. The data set used to develop these
models was contained to one year. Using the same methods described here to construct
models on other supply chains would be interesting as well as a useful extension. Like136

wise, including additional explanatory variables, the interaction of explanatory variables,
as well as exploring the use of other machine learning classiﬁcation algorithms in comparison to the multinomial logistic regression methodology described here would serve to
further substantiate our approach. One example of a variable that was not available at the
time of this study relates to the single or sole source position of the supplier in the supply
chain. Understanding the impact of these types of suppliers on the reliability of procurements would be beneﬁcial in the supplier selection process as well as during risk mitigation
planning. Lastly, we plan to deploy the model in a real-world application in order to further
validate the prediction capabilities of the models.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
5.1

Summary
The focus of this research was to develop foundational methods for practitioners in

a LVHV supply chain to predict, evaluate, and mitigate risks within the supply chain in
advance of those risks being realized. Although developed using data and case studies from
a LVHV supply chain, the methodology has potential application in other types of supply
chains. The ability to organize a supply chain schematically, identify potential risks, assess
the overall reliability of the supply chain, and predict the reliability of a procurement are
all activities that are important to a ﬁrm’s success. The inability to perform these tasks with
some degree of success can have catastrophic consequences to a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial stability
and to an entire industry. The supply chains that are used to construct nuclear power plants
are one example of an industry that has suffered such consequences.
The methods discussed in this dissertation outline an approach using fault tree analysis
to organize a supply chain schematically from the bill of materials of the product being
sourced. Next, we leveraged the structure of the fault tree in combination with Boolean
algebra to evaluate the overall reliability of the supply chain. Subsequently, we developed
optimization models to identify potential risks as well as mitigation activities to maximize
the supply chain system reliability under budgetary constraints. Lastly, we deﬁned reliabil138

ity using standard industry metrics and developed a multinomial logistic regression model
to predict the reliability/unreliability of a procurement using data from a LVHV ﬁrm. Contributions to the literature were made in each of the areas discussed.
In the sections that follow, we draw conclusions more speciﬁcally within each area of
the research and discuss recommendations for future work.
5.2

Model Supply Chain Risk
In this dissertation, we introduced a new application for fault tree analysis, which

served as a foundational element of our research. The use of a fault tree to represent a
supply chain enabled the use of the techniques associated with fault tree analysis to evaluate the supply chain as a system. Further, by using a product’s bill of materials as the basis
for constructing the fault tree, the method provides the ﬂexibility to evaluate the supply
chain at various tiers and from a variety of perspectives. Case studies using examples of
products sourced in a LVHV industry were presented to demonstrate the practical application of such an approach.
After constructing the fault tree, we calculated the overall system unreliability of the
supply chain. Next, four scenarios that practitioners face were proposed to demonstrate
the usefulness of the concept as an evaluation tool when making procurement decisions.
The scenarios included adding a second redundant supplier, improving the existing supplier, replacing the existing supplier with an improved supplier, and adding a second improved supplier. A cost model was proposed and applied to each of the four scenarios
being evaluated. Subsequently, the system unreliability was re-calculated for each of the
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four scenarios. The tradeoff between the mitigation cost and unreliability improvement
were evaluated for each of the scenarios in comparison to the baseline scenario where no
modiﬁcations to the supply chain were made.
The results of the study indicated that introducing a redundant supplier with improved
performance provided the greatest reduction in system unreliability at a slightly lower total
cost than adding an equivalently unreliable supplier. Although speciﬁc to the supply chain
and decisions posed for each scenario, the results demonstrated the approach as a tool for
supply chain professionals to evaluate seemingly indistinguishable decision outcomes in
an objective and quantitative way. Furthermore, the method provides an opportunity to
evaluate the potential decision outcomes and impact on the supply chain system prior to
carrying out a procurement decision. In the absence of the tools presented, decisions are
left to a high degree of subjectivity and made within silos without knowledge of other
related decisions. The methodology presented provides a signiﬁcant improvement to the
current manner in which procurement decisions are made in LVHV supply chains. Further,
greater visibility is given to the potential costs of decisions and higher risk areas within
a supply chain system. In conclusion, the research presented here demonstrates that a
complex supply chain can be organized as a system using a fault tree architecture and
subsequently analyzed to assess risk.
5.3

Mitigate Supply Chain Risk
In the second of the three arms of the research presented in this dissertation, we built

upon the concept of representing a supply chain as a fault tree based on a product’s bill
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of materials and applied mixed integer programs to optimize the overall reliability of the
system by selecting risk mitigating actions with consideration for budgetary constraints.
More speciﬁcally, we developed two models and applied those models to LVHV ﬁrms
that participate in two separate tiers of the nuclear power plant construction supply chain
to demonstrate the robustness of the approach. The ﬁrst ﬁrm studied is responsible for
delivering the pressurized water reactor to the nuclear power plant. The second supply
chain studied was a lower tier supplier providing a thrust bearing; a major component in
the steam turbine, which is part of the pressurized water reactor.
The ﬁrst modeling approach presented, referred to as the PMM, focused on selecting
risk mitigating actions that set the reliability of the minimal cut set within the fault tree
equal to 100% reliability. Like before, suppliers are represented as basic events in the
model and sets of suppliers comprise minimal cut sets. Although directionally helpful to
apply risk mitigating actions on sets of suppliers in the supply chain, the PMM does not
select the speciﬁc risk mitigation action to apply to a speciﬁc supplier. All risk mitigating
actions were given a standard cost of $12,209, which represented the cost associated with
improving a supplier’s reliability by 15% over their current performance.
Extending the PMM, we developed an IMM. Although similar to the approach developed for the PMM, the IMM delivers additional information regarding the speciﬁc mitigation actions to take on speciﬁc suppliers. We selected four mitigation options with different costs and associated reliability improvements to demonstrate the approach. In order to
more effectively apply a mixed integer optimization program to the fault tree architecture,
we converted the fault tree into a binary decision diagram using the component connection
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method. Doing so reduced the mathematical complexities associated with optimizing directly on the fault tree and further enabled the model to select speciﬁc suppliers to mitigate
within the supply chain.
Both mitigation models were applied to two supply chains, run at a range of risk mitigation budgets, and results compared to one another. The results demonstrated the value
and practical nature of the approach to supply chain professionals tasked with making mitigation decisions across two sizes and scopes of LVHV supply chains. Further, this research
illustrated methods to select activities that should be undertaken to mitigate risk within the
supply chain and simultaneously minimize risk while at the same time achieving budgetary
goals.
5.4

Quantify Supplier Risk
The objective of the third topic outlined in this dissertation was to develop a mathe-

matical model to predict the reliability of a procurement in a LVHV supply chain. The
explanatory variables in the model were selected based on the experience of supply chain
professionals. Additionally, to prove the practical worthiness of the model, the underlying
data describing each of the explanatory variables selected for the model had to be available
via a ﬁrm’s ERP system. Using a set of 42 explanatory variables, we developed seven
multinomial logistic regression models. Each model described supply chain reliability in
terms of on-time delivery, ﬁrst time hardware quality, ﬁrst time documentation quality, and
the combinations thereof.
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Logistic regression was chosen as the modeling method because the response variable describes the probability of an event. Ten-fold cross validation was applied to assess
the performance of each of the seven models. In general, each model performed well
(> 0.7200) across all of the performance metrics selected. In addition to analyzing the
magnitudes of the coefﬁcients of each variable, we tested the odds ratio for each of the
explanatory variables and levels for statistical signiﬁcance.
Overall, the results indicated that variables associated with the supplier, the geographic
location of the supplier, and the supplier’s core competencies were signiﬁcant with respect
to reliably supplying product to the ﬁrm. However, in general terms neither the volume of
the product procured nor the timing of the procurement were found to be signiﬁcant. These
conclusions provide insight for the supply chain professional to focus more effort on the
supplier and the suppliers’ attributes to manage the associated risks; whereas, less priority
should be given to adjusting the quantity procured, managing the structure of the purchase
order, or controlling the timing of the procurement. Further, the results correspond well
with the observations made by Schlissel et al. [4] regarding the erosion of qualiﬁed and
capable suppliers within the nuclear industry and further substantiate the need to invest
time in the supplier selection process to ensure that suppliers are competent to complete
the work requested of them.
In conclusion, the logistic regression model developed as part of this research demonstrates a practical method to predict the reliability of a procurement in a LVHV supply
chain. In doing so, we were also able to provide insight as to the signiﬁcant factors that
affect reliability. Both of these results have practical signiﬁcance in supply chain risk man143

agement, improve a ﬁrm’s ability to more quantitatively understand the supply chain risks
faced, and subsequently minimize the effects of those risks.
5.5

Research Limitations and Future Work
The research contained in this dissertation was limited to LVHV supply chains. Ex-

tending and testing these concepts across different supply chains in different industries
would be both useful and interesting.
In addition, although building off one another each of the three areas of research presented were done independently. Developing a software instrument that integrates the three
areas together would have signiﬁcant practical application. Doing so would also improve
the applicability across supply chain practitioners of varying levels of computational experience. More speciﬁcally, the activities associated with constructing a fault tree from a
ﬁrm’s bill of materials, converting the fault tree into a binary decision diagram, and applying the proposed optimization models is somewhat tedious. Automating and integrating
these processes could prove useful as would tying the data streams used into a ﬁrm’s ERP
system.
The cost model presented as part of “Modeling Supply Chain Risk” was based on empirical data. However, improving it and extending it into the areas described within “Mitigate Supply Chain Risk” would be useful. In addition, studying the cost sensitivity around
budgets and the resulting risk mitigating decisions could have practical importance for
supply chain budget managers. More speciﬁcally, expanding the cost modeling capability
to include better insights into the marginal utility between the risk mitigation budget and
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the resulting supply chain portfolio reliability could be useful in setting budgets, planning
resources, and selecting suppliers.
In both the “Modeling Supply Chain Risk” and “Mitigating Supply Chain Risk” areas
presented, the supplier is assumed to be known by the ﬁrm. In practice, this is not always
the case. For example, the data used in this research is not available for new suppliers
that the ﬁrm is considering. On one hand, this further validates the efﬁcacy and need for
the model presented within the “Quantify Supplier Risk” research area. In contrast, if the
supplier is unknown completely, the methods presented are difﬁcult to implement. As a
result, developing a method to predict a supplier’s reliability based on a set of attributes
would be helpful. The work completed within this dissertation can serve as a basis to
explore this area further.
The approach presented to model the supply chain system as a fault tree assumes independence and a static state. However, in reality supply chains are neither independent
nor static. We relaxed the independence assumption to some extent by integrating suppliers and procurements with similar characteristics through the logistic regression model
and underlying data sets. Exploring the dependence of suppliers, events, decisions, and
consequences, across the supply chain in more detail is a worthy effort. The application
of dynamic fault tree analysis, stochastic models, and other available methods is recommended. Similarly, throughout this research we assumed that events were immediately
repairable and did not investigate the effects that downtime or unrepairable events may
have on the supply chain.
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The methods described within this research effectively utilize probability as a basis for
reliability. However, like downtime, we did not analyze the supply chains being studied in
terms of the severities or the consequences associated with the deﬁnition of risk. Further,
we did not extend our approaches into the ﬁnancial impacts that decisions or risks may
have on the ﬁrm’s overall ﬁnancial performance. Paths to assess various metrics of risk
using the methods described in this dissertation are recommended as future research and
would have practical signiﬁcance.
The logistic regression model presented serves as a foundation for further research.
First, it would be interesting to develop models for different supply chains and using different machine learning classiﬁcation methods to compare results and test the overarching
hypothesis that LVHV supply chains are in-fact different than other supply chain constructs. Furthermore, we did not include interaction variables within our model. This may
also prove as a useful extension as well as the inclusion of additional explanatory variables.
The variables included in the model were restricted to those collected by the ﬁrm. One example of a variable that may have practical signiﬁcance is related to a supplier’s sole or
single source position within a ﬁrm’s supply chain.
Lastly, we recommend implementing the concepts contained within this dissertation either in part or in full within a LVHV ﬁrm to further validate the concepts proposed. When
implemented decisions made should be logged and compared with the actual outcomes
and costs incurred. For example, a supply chain professional may determine that adding a
redundant supplier will reduce the overall risk within the portfolio to an acceptable level
when developing a fault tree to represent the bill of material of the product being sourced.
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After implementing the decision, the results should be monitored to determine if the overall reduction in portfolio risk was achieved. If the results predicted by the model were
not realized, causes should be identiﬁed, and modiﬁcations should be made to tune the
accuracy of the model. Similar analyses could be performed to determine the accuracy of
the predicted results with respect to mitigating risks and allocating resources when a ﬁrm
implements the optimization models presented within this research as part of their decision
toolkit.
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APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF NOTATION
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Table A.1: Summary of notation used in Chapter 2.
Notation
F (t)
t

Description
probability that the system experiences at least one failure during a speciﬁed time period
time period; 52 weeks

R(t)

probability that the supplier makes all of its deliveries on time within the time interval

fij (t)

probability that the supplier has failed to deliver their respective service on time within the interval [0, t]

i

supplier

j

service

fij

annualized unreliability for basic service i sourced from supplier j

xij

annualized units of basic service i delivered on time by supplier j

yij

units of basic service i expected annually by supplier j

n

total number of basic services within supply chain

m

total number of suppliers within supply chain

gkOR
gkAN D

the gate unreliability of OR gate k
the gate unreliability of AND gate k

q

the total number of gates within the fault tree

k

fault tree gate index

FS

Fault tree system unreliaiblity

timprove
ij

time (hours) invested annually to improve a supplier

tonboard
ij
toversight
ij

time (hours) invested annually to onboard a supplier
time (hours) invested annually to provide oversight to maintain supplier

u

unreliability improvement ratio from s1 to s2

e

⇡ 2.71828

s1

initial state of unreliability of supplier j to deliver basic service i

s2

improved state of unreliability of supplier j to deliver basic service i

conboard
ij
cimprove
ij
coversight
ij

cost of adding new supplier or replacing an existing with an improved supplier
cost of improving an existing supplier
cost of providing overisight to a supplier to maintain performance
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Table A.2: Summary of notation used in Chapter 3.
Notation
Ui

Description
the probability that cut set i occurs; unreliabilty of cut set i

i

minimal cut set index

I

set of all minimal cut sets

xi

binomial decision variable; xi = 1 if minimal cut set i is mitigated and 0 otherwise

yj

binomial decision variable; yi = 1 if supplier j is mitigated and 0 otherwise

j

supplier index

J

set of all suppliers

Ji

set of suppliers that are members of cut set i

b

total mitigation budget of the ﬁrm

cj

cost of mitigating supplier j

cjk

cost of mitigating supplier j with mitigation activity k

Pj,`(j,!)

the probability of supplier j in path ! with state `

!

terminal 1 node path

`

state; ` = 0 if success state and ` = 1 if failed state

Pj,!

simpliﬁed notation for Pj,`(j,!)

⌦

terminal 1 node paths

J!

set of suppliers contained in path !

k

mitigation activity peformed on a supplier

Pj,!,k

the probability that supplier j along path ! given mitigation activity k was performed on supplier j

yjk

binary decision variable; yjk = 1 if mitigation activity k performed on supplier j and 0 otherwise

!
wrk

the partial probability associated with each path (!)

r
|J! |

the order of the supplier within path (!)
all suppliers with path (!) beginning with the second (r = 2) supplier in the path

kj⇤

mitigation selected for supplier j in the optimal solution

uj

unreliability of supplier j

US

unreliability of the system being studied

RS

reliability of the system being studied

USREA
MM
RP
S
M
RIM
S
S

unreliability of the system being studied; calculated using the rare event approximation

reliability of system being studied; calculated using the perfect mitigation model
reliability of system being studied; calculated using the imperfect mitigation model
metric used to compare the perfrect and imperfect mitigation model differences of the system being studied
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Table A.3: Summary of notation used in Chapter 4.
Notation

Description

r

index for the reliability model

n

number of purchase orders and line items

i

index for explanatory/dependent variables

p

number of predictors

⇡r (x)

probability that Y = 1

Y

binary response variable

xi

explanatory variable

↵

intercept parameter

i

⇡

the effect of xi on the log odds that Y = 1
probability of success
a parameter corresponding to the relative importance of precision vs. recall

⌦

odds

✓

odds ratio

u

upper cutoff limit for the 95% conﬁdence interval

l

lower cutoff limit for the 95% conﬁdence interval

z

z-score; indicates how many standard deviations an element is from the mean

m

index representing the levels of each explanatory variable
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APPENDIX B
EXTRA MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 4
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Table B.1: Summary results of full model (1 of 7).
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Table B.2: Summary results of full model (2 of 7).
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Table B.3: Summary results of full model (3 of 7).
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Table B.4: Summary results of full model (4 of 7).
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Table B.5: Summary results of full model (5 of 7).
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Table B.6: Summary results of full model (6 of 7).

172

Table B.7: Summary results of full model (7 of 7).
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